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ARTICLES
U.S. CLASS ACTIONS GO GLOBAL:
TRANSNATIONAL CLASS ACTIONS AND
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Debra Lyn Bassett*
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the United States Supreme
Court held that plaintiff class members residing outside the forum
state are entitled to the "minimal due process protections" of notice,
an opportunity to be heard, an opportunity to opt out, and adequate
representation. However, class actions involving class members not
just from other states but from other countries raise distinctive due
process concerns in each of these areas. In this Article, Professor
Bassett examines the considerations impacting on due process and
personal jurisdiction when non-U.S. claimants participate in class
litigation, and proposes guidelines necessary to ensure that the class
judgment will have a binding effect on foreign claimants.
INTRODUCTION
United States courts learned long ago that injuries sometimes occur
on a large scale crossing state boundaries. And courts within this
country employ the class action device, not without controversy, to
bring dispersed class members before a single geographically-situated
court for a "global" resolution of the claims.1 But what about the
situation in which the class action is literally global, involving injuries
distributed among several countries throughout the world? Can these
* Associate Professor of Law, Michigan State University-DCL College of Law. J.D.
1987, University of California, Davis; M.S. 1982, San Diego State University; B.A.
1977, University of Vermont. Many thanks to Rex R. Perschbacher for his comments
on an earlier draft; to Charles Ten Brink and the Michigan State law library staff; and
to Dean Terence Blackburn for his encouragement and research support.
1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class actions filed in federal court,
and most states have modeled their class action provisions upon Rule 23. See Kurt A.
Schwarz, Note, Due Process and Equitable Relief in State Multistate Class Actions
After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 415, 425 n.84 (1989) (stating
that "thirty-eight states have adopted a class action rule modeled on amended federal
rule 23"); see also Robert H. Klonoff & Edward K.M. Bilich, Class Actions and Other
Multi-Party Litigation 439 (2000) ("Approximately two-thirds of the states have class-
action rules patterned after Federal Rule 23."). Recent legislation authorizes
increased use of the federal courts as forums for class litigation based on reduced
diversity jurisdiction requirements. See Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1369
(2002)) (authorizing original jurisdiction over single-event accidents in which there is
minimal diversity between adverse parties and where seventy-five or more natural
persons have died).
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class members be brought before a United States court for a "global"
resolution?
Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the special problem of
non-U.S. class members' participation in U.S.-situated class litigation.
"International" class actions tend to evoke images of an entirely
foreign class suing a U.S. defendant, as in the Bhopal disaster.2
However, class actions have an "international" component whenever
class membership crosses national boundaries, such as cases where the
vast majority of the class members are from the U.S., but the class
also includes non-U.S. individuals.' In light of current marketing,
transportation, and communication technologies, it is not surprising
that many kinds of harm pay no attention to state-or national-
geographical boundaries, thus damaging people on both sides of a
territorial border. And, in fact, at least some U.S.-based class actions
have included class members from outside the United States, but
without any serious judicial discussion of the potential implications to
the non-U.S. class members, to the defendant, or to the efficacy of the
court's judgment.4
Previous commentary regarding "international class actions" has
tended to focus on the unavailability of a class action procedural
device in most other countries.5  Other authorities 6  and
2. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
The Bhopal case, which was dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, involved:
thousands of claims by citizens of India and the Government of India arising
out of the most devastating industrial disaster in history-the deaths of over
2,000 persons and injuries of over 200,000 caused by lethal gas known as
methyl isocyanate which was released from a chemical plant operated by
Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) in Bhopal, India ....
Id. at 197.
3. See infra note 4 and authorities cited therein.
4. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,799 (1985) (noting that
class members resided "in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and several foreign
countries") (emphasis added); see also In re Pizza Time Theatre Sec. Litig., 112
F.R.D. 15, 17 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (class included members from 28 states and 15 foreign
countries); In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 69 F.R.D. 24, 32 (S.D. Cal. 1975) (named
plaintiff class representatives "are foreign entities that operate abroad").
5. See, e.g., Am. Arbitration Ass'n, ADR Vision Roundtable: Challenges for the
21st Century, 56 Disp. Resol. J. 8, 86 (2001) (noting that "there aren't any
international class actions-there are just U.S. class actions"); see also Neil Andrews,
Multi-Party Proceedings in England: Representative and Group Actions, 11 Duke J.
Comp. & Int'l L. 249 (2001); Christopher Hodges, Multi-Party Actions: A European
Approach, 11 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 321 (2001); Harald Koch, Non-Class Group
Litigation Under EU and German Law, 11 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 355 (2001);
Gerhard Walter, Mass Tort Litigation in Germany and Switzerland, 11 Duke J. Comp.
& Int'l Law 369 (2001); infra note 131 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Am. Law Inst., International Jurisdiction and Judgments Project,
Discussion Draft § 6, at 70-71 (Mar. 29, 2002) ("[D]omicile, habitual residence, or
place of incorporation of the plaintiff is not an acceptable ground for exercise of
judicial jurisdiction for purposes of recognition or enforcement; in contrast, domicile,
habitual residence, and place of incorporation of the defendant are universally
accepted bases of judicial jurisdiction, as they are in this Act."); Am. Law Inst.,
[Vol. 72
2003] CLASS ACTIONS GO GLOBAL
commentators7 have discussed the impact of a foreign defendant in
traditional, non-class litigation. Largely unexplored, however, is the
impact of the participation of other countries' citizens in U.S.-based
class action litigation.8
Some of the ramifications of a transnational class action become
evident when viewed through the lens of so-called "nationwide" class
actions.9 Nationwide class actions have presented issues concerning
pre-existing cases,' ° manageability, 1 choice of law, 2 and personal
Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure, Discussion Draft No. 3 § 3, at
27 (Apr. 8, 2002) ("Jurisdiction over a party should be exercised when the connection
between the forum state and the party or the transaction or occurrence in dispute is
substantial."); id. at 27-28 ("The standard of 'substantial connection' has been
generally accepted for international legal disputes. That standard excludes mere
physical presence, which within the United States is colloquially called 'tag
jurisdiction."'); Gary B. Born et al., International Civil Litigation in United States
Courts 92-93, 137 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter Born, International Civil Litigation]
(observing that "personal jurisdiction analysis ordinarily focuses on the burdens that
litigation in the forum imposes on the defendant, not the plaintiff," and discussing due
process implications of presence of a foreign defendant).
7. A number of commentators have discussed the implications of transnational
litigation in the non-class context. See, e.g., Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial
Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1, 1 (1987) [hereinafter
Born, Reflections] (proposing "a modification of domestic Due Process limitations on
personal jurisdiction in cases involving foreign defendants"); Linda J. Silberman,
Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation:
Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 28 Tex. Int'l L.J. 501,
504 (1993) (proposing "federal legislation establishing standards for jurisdiction over
alien defendants and clearer rules for access to United States courts by foreign
plaintiffs injured abroad"); Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Law: The Neglected
Role of the International Law of Personal Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts, 36 Harv.
Int'l L.J. 373, 375 (1995) ("challeng[ing] the current assumption that the domestic law
of jurisdiction should be applied by domestic courts when asserting personal
jurisdiction in cases involving foreign litigants").
8. See Am. Law Inst., Complex Litigation: Statutory Recommendations and
Analysis § 3.08, at 147-49 (1994) (discussing personal jurisdiction in complex
litigation cases involving transfer and consolidation under 28 U.S.C. § 1407, and
stating that because "opposition to transfer and consolidation may come from the
plaintiff, the defendant, or both," the transferee court "should apply the same
personal jurisdiction analysis to unwilling plaintiffs and defendants alike"); id. at 448
(proposing new § 2370, which would authorize personal jurisdiction "over any
party... to the full extent of the power conferrable on a federal court under the
United States Constitution"); see also id. at 158-60 (discussing impact of foreign
defendant, but not foreign plaintiff).
9. See, e.g., Graham C. Lilly, Modeling Class Actions: The Representative Suit as
an Analytic Tool, 81 Neb. L. Rev. 1008, 1045 (2003) (noting "the rise of nationwide
class actions").
10. See, e.g., In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1088 (6th Cir. 1996)
(reversing class certification because, among other reasons, "previously-filed cases at
more advanced stages of litigation" would thus "[be thrown] into disarray");
Geraghty v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 719 F.2d 1199, 1205 (3d Cir. 1983) (upholding
refusal to certify a nationwide class because it "might interfere with the litigation of
similar issues in other judicial districts").
11. See, e.g., Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d 309, 328 (5th Cir. 1978)
(reversing certification of a nationwide class, in part, because "we have difficulty
envisioning how the plaintiffs can prove in a manageable manner that the [alleged]
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jurisdiction.13 Extending the reach of a class action judgment beyond
U.S. borders adds a new dimension to each determination in class
litigation. A transnational class action requires an examination of
potential international law and treaty obligations, a careful evaluation
of the laws of the countries involved, and an examination of the
potential cultural, linguistic, and logistical implications. As an initial
foray into this arena, this Article undertakes an examination of only
one of those issues-that of personal jurisdiction.
The United States Supreme Court has provided guidelines for
dealing with due process and personal jurisdiction in the class action
context. 14 However, as this Article explains, the presence of non-U.S.
claimants in class litigation requires additional due process
protections. 5 In particular, this Article concludes that due process
requires an affirmative opt-in procedure in order to bind non-U.S.
claimants to a U.S. class judgment. 6
Part I sets forth the due process and personal jurisdiction concepts
underlying the discussion in this Article. 7 Part II examines how
personal jurisdiction issues arise in transnational class actions, and
how the principles of current personal jurisdiction jurisprudence
facilitate-and hinder-due process. "8  Finally, Part III proposes
additional due process safeguards for transnational class actions. 9
conspiracy was indeed implemented in a particular geographical area").
12. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823 (1985) (reversing
judgment "insofar as [the state court's judgment] held that Kansas law was applicable
to all of the transactions which it sought to adjudicate"); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (reversing certification of a nationwide class, in part,
due to differences in the laws among the states); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d
734 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that choice of law issues in a nationwide class action
created concerns sufficient to reverse class certification).
13. See, e.g., Shutts, 472 U.S. at 806-14 (discussing personal jurisdiction issues
raised by the inclusion of citizens of other states who lack local contacts); In re Sch.
Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1002 (3d Cir. 1986) (observing that mandatory class
actions "raise[] serious questions of personal jurisdiction and intrusion into the
autonomous operation of state judicial systems").
14. See infra notes 94-117 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court
guidance in Shutts regarding personal jurisdiction in class actions).
15. See infra notes 125-220 and accompanying text (analyzing shortcomings of
current approaches); see also infra note 134 (discussing the propriety of according full
due process protections to foreign claimants).
16. See infra notes 233-41 and accompanying text (proposing affirmative opt-in
procedures for non-U.S. claimants).
17. See infra notes 20-124 and accompanying text (setting out concepts).
18. See infra notes 125-93 and accompanying text (discussing personal jurisdiction
and due process issues in transnational class actions).
19. See infra notes 194-242 and accompanying text (proposing jurisdictional
analysis for transnational class actions).
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I. UNDERLYING CONCEPTS OF DUE PROCESS AND PERSONAL
JURISDICTION
The jurisdictional analysis proposed by this Article presupposes an
understanding of due process and personal jurisdiction principles.
This section begins with a brief background regarding these areas.
A. A Brief Overview of Due Process in the Context of Litigation
Rights
The United States Supreme Court has articulated the notion of
constitutional due process 0 in a number of different ways. The Court
has stated that due process "'is not a technical conception with a fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,' ''. but rather,
"expresses the requirement of 'fundamental fairness,' a requirement
whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty."2 Indeed,
"[d]ue process is that which comports with the deepest notions of
what is fair and right and just." 3
Although due process may equate with fairness, more detailed
descriptions are helpful in ascertaining whether the purposes and
goals of due process are satisfied. Due process plays dual roles in
several ways. Courts and commentators refer to both "substantive"
due process and "procedural" due process under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments in discussing personal jurisdiction.24 When
20. Although the Supreme Court has approached state court jurisdiction as
involving constitutional considerations of due process, at least one commentator has
argued that personal jurisdiction is not of a constitutional dimension. See Patrick J.
Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From
Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 19 (1990) [hereinafter
Borchers, Death of Personal Jurisdiction] (arguing that state court personal
jurisdiction is not a matter of constitutional law).
21. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)
(internal citation omitted); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)
("[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.").
22. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981); see Harold S. Lewis, Jr.,
The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in the
Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 Notre Dame L. Rev. 699, 732 (1983)
(describing the due process clause as "one of the murkiest constitutional mandates");
Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation,
and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 296, 357 (1996) ("While the sources are history, tradition,
the Constitution, judicial applications, and democratic principles, the definition of due
process offered is, save for the articulation of the concepts of notice and hearing,
close to tautological."); id. (noting that the purposes of due process are "ensuring
accuracy and legitimacy of decisionmaking and popular acceptance").
23. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
24. Black's Law Dictionary 449 (5th ed. 1979) ("There are two aspects [of due
process]: procedural, in which a person is guaranteed fair procedures and substantive
which protects a person's property from unfair governmental interference or
taking."). But see Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have to Do With
Jurisdiction?, 46 Rutgers L. Rev. 1071, 1074-75 (1994).
The law of due process is usually thought to have two components:
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discussing due process of law, the term again encompasses dual
concepts of jurisdiction and procedure. 25  Thus, a valid judgment
requires that the court have jurisdiction (physical power) over the
person or property involved, and that the procedural protections of
notice and an opportunity to be heard have been accorded.26
Courts and commentators refer to personal jurisdiction in both
contexts. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
acts as a limitation upon state court assertions of personal
jurisdiction27 by requiring that the defendant have minimum contacts
with the forum state. 28 "[P]ersonal jurisdiction has come to involve
procedural due process and substantive due process. The constitutional law
of jurisdiction resembles neither. It differs from the law of procedural due
process, which ensures fairness in the decision-making procedures used by
judicial, administrative and other governmental bodies. Procedural due
process requires that before any person is deprived of life, liberty or
property through an official proceeding, he be given notice and a meaningful
opportunity to protect his interests. By contrast, the law of jurisdiction is
not concerned with notice and the opportunity to be heard. Rather, its
stated concerns are the power of a court to determine a defendant's
obligations and the propriety of the court's doing so.
The law of jurisdiction also differs from the law of substantive due
process, which prevents excessive government encroachment on
fundamental rights and interests. There is no identifiable, fundamental right
threatened by exercises of jurisdiction.... [T]he Constitution betrays no
concern, express or implied, to protect individuals from having to defend
lawsuits in states where they do not live. Quite the contrary. The
Constitution's Article III grant of diversity jurisdiction presumes that
individuals will litigate, both as plaintiffs and as defendants, away from their
homes, and facilitates that litigation by providing a neutral forum.
Id.
25. 1 Herbert Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions § 1.15, at 1-41
(3d ed. 1992) ("In traditional suits, due process involves two elements: a jurisdictional
one and a procedural one."). In federal question cases involving foreign defendants,
the legal standard is whether the foreign defendant has "sufficient contacts with the
United States as a whole in order to satisfy Fifth Amendment Due Process
requirements." Pyrenee, Ltd. v. Wocom Commodities Ltd., 984 F. Supp. 1148, 1159
(N.D. Ill. 1997); see also Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir.
1989) (same).
26. 1 Newberg & Conte, supra note 25, § 1.15, at 1-41 to 1-42.
27. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980)
("Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced
to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong
interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most
convenient location for the litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument
of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a
valid judgment."); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (noting that
jurisdictional restrictions are "more than a guarantee of immunity from
inconvenien[ce]," but are "a consequence of [the] territorial limitations on the
power[s] of the respective States").
28. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows... from the
Due Process Clause. The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and
protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial
power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.
2003] CLASS ACTIONS GO GLOBAL
not only an inquiry into the territorial power of the sovereign,[29 ] but
also the protection of the defendant's individual due process interests
in avoiding unduly burdensome litigation in a distant forum. 30
Second, the procedural components also must be accorded:
ineffective service of process, for example, will prevent the court from
acquiring personal jurisdiction over the defendant.31 These concepts
can overlap, as in "tag" jurisdiction, where service of process within
the forum state accomplishes the procedural component and also
confers personal jurisdiction, even if the defendant's contacts with the
forum would not otherwise independently satisfy the minimum
contacts test.32
The standards needed to satisfy due process in a class action context
may differ from those in traditional non-class litigation, but the
overall goal-to obtain a fair and binding judgment-is the same.33 A
class action, of course, is representational litigation, in which the
named plaintiffs34 represent both themselves and a class of similarly-
Thus, the test for personal jurisdiction requires that "the maintenance of the
suit.., not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'
Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03
(1982) (citation omitted).
29. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) (holding that state court jurisdiction
rests on notions of territoriality and state sovereignty); see also Lea Brilmayer, An
Introduction to Jurisdiction in the American Federal System 20 (1986) [hereinafter
Brilmayer, American Federal System] (noting that both "basis and process" must
exist for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction); id. ("Basis refers to the relationship
between a party and the sovereign (the state) from which the court derives its power.
Process refers to the procedural steps prescribed by the sovereign to connect the
party with the court: that is, process requires sufficient notice to the defendant.").
30. Elizabeth Barker Brandt, Fairness to the Absent Members of a Defendant
Class: A Proposed Revision of Rule 23, 1990 BYU L. Rev. 909, 934; see also Ins. Corp.
of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702 n.10 ("The restriction on state sovereign power described
in World-Wide Volkswagen... must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual
liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause.").
31. See Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987)
("Before a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the
procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied."); Miss. Publ'g
Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1946) ("[Slervice of summons is the
procedure by which a court having venue and jurisdiction of the subject matter of the
suit asserts jurisdiction over the person of the party served.").
32. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (holding that if the
defendant is physically present in the forum state at the time that process is served
upon him, satisfaction of the minimum contacts test is unnecessary).
33. 1 Newberg & Conte, supra note 25, § 4.46, at 4-183 to 4-184.
Fundamental elements of due process in traditional litigation require that
personal rights cannot be legally compromised without notice and
opportunity to be heard by a court with personal jurisdiction over the party
defendant involved. Due process necessary to reach a binding decision on
common issues in a class action is satisfied by different procedures than
those necessary in traditional, nonclass litigation.
Id. (internal footnotes omitted).
34. This Article will tend to refer to plaintiff classes, which are far more common
than defendant classes. See Robert R. Simpson & Craig Lyle Perra, Defendant Class
Actions, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 1319, 1322-23 (2000) (noting that defendant class actions
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situated others in pursuing a remedy." In recognition of this
representational aspect, the United States Supreme Court has
observed:
The only way a class-action defendant like petitioner can assure
itself of this binding effect of the judgment is to ascertain that the
forum court has jurisdiction over every plaintiff whose claim it seeks
to adjudicate, sufficient to support a defense of res judicata in a later
suit for damages by class members.36
Thus, the binding effect of the lawsuit is crucial to evaluating due
process in the class action context.37
In Hansberry v. Lee,38 the Supreme Court observed that although
one generally is not bound by a judgment unless she has been made a
party, the class action device is an exception to this rule.39
[M]embers of a class not present as parties to the litigation may be
bound by the judgment where they are in fact adequately
represented by parties who are present, or where they actually
participate in the conduct of the litigation in which members of the
class are present as parties .... or where the interest of the members
of the class, some of whom are present as parties, is joint, or where
for any other reason the relationship between the parties present
are rare).
35. See 1 Newberg & Conte, supra note 25, § 1.02, at 1-5 ("The fundamental
nature of a class suit is its representative status .. "); Charles Alan Wright & Mary
Kay Kane, Law of Federal Courts § 72, at 510 (6th ed. 2002) ("[A class action]
provides a means by which, when a large group of persons are interested in a matter,
one or more may sue or be sued as representatives of the class without needing to join
every member of the class.").
36. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 805 (1985). Under res judicata
principles, a lawsuit involving the same parties and based upon the same underlying
cause of action as was asserted in a previous case in which there has been a judgment
on the merits is barred, including all claims that were raised or which could have been
raised in the previous proceeding. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,
326 n.5 (1979).
37. See Linda S. Mullenix, Class Actions, Personal Jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs' Due
Process: Implications for Mass Tort Litigation, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 871, 910 (1995)
[hereinafter Mullenix, Mass Tort] (noting that "a court's judgment preclusively binds
the plaintiffs as well as the defendants"); see also 1 Newberg & Conte, supra note 25,
§ 4.46, at 4-183 ("Generally, due process in the class action context must assure
procedural fairness to absent members before they will be held bound by a final
decision on the common issues involved.").
38. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
39. Id. at 40-41. The Court stated:
It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that
one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not
designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of
process.... To these general rules there is a recognized exception that, to
an extent not precisely defined by judicial opinion, the judgment in a "class"
or "representative" suit, to which some members of the class are parties,
may bind members of the class or those represented who were not made
parties to it.
Id. (citations omitted).
[Vol. 72
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and those who are absent is such as legally to entitle the former to
stand in judgment for the latter.4"
The Hansberry Court viewed adequate representation as the
benchmark of due process for absent class members.
[S]o far as it can be said that the members of the class who are
present are, by generally recognized rules of law, entitled to stand in
judgment for those who are not, we may assume for present
purposes that such procedure affords a protection to the parties who
are represented though absent, which would satisfy the
requirements of due process and full faith and credit."
The Supreme Court subsequently modified this view by finding that
adequate representation alone will not always satisfy due process-at
least in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions involving monetary relief, an
opportunity to opt out also must be provided.42 However, adequate
representation remains the absolute baseline of due process in class
actions.43 Without adequate representation, due process cannot exist
in the class action context; at least in some circumstances, more will
be required even if adequate representation exists.
In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor," the Supreme Court
returned to the importance of adequate representation in the context
of reviewing a class action settlement. The Court found that the
defined class did not satisfy adequacy of representation because "[t]he
settling parties... achieved a global compromise with no structural
assurance of fair and adequate representation for the diverse groups
and individuals affected."45  The Court noted that "[i]n significant
40. Id. at 42-43 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court again recently affirmed
the ability to collaterally attack a prior class action judgment on the basis of
inadequate representation. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 123 S. Ct. 2161 (2003)
(4 to 4 per curiam opinion affirming a Second Circuit decision holding that a veteran
injured by exposure to Agent Orange while serving in the military in Vietnam-but
whose injuries did not become manifest until the settlement funds from a prior global
class action settlement were exhausted-could collaterally attack the prior class
action settlement on the basis of inadequate representation). See generally William T.
Allen, Finality of Judgments in Class Actions: A Comment on Epstein v. MCA, Inc.,
73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1149 (1998); Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate
Search for "Adequacy" in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 765 (1998); Patrick Woolley, The Availability of Collateral Attack for
Inadequate Representation in Class Suits, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 383 (2000) [hereinafter
Woolley, Collateral Attack].
41. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 43; see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815,
848 & n.24 (1999) (reiterating Hansberry's requirement of adequate representation to
protect the interests of absent class members).
42. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985).
43. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Life After Amchem: The Class Struggle
Continues, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 373, 383 (1998) ("Adequacy of representation is the
touchstone of due process .... ); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in
the Law of Class Actions, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 337, 369 (noting that due process
traditionally has been measured by adequacy of representation).
44. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
45. Id. at 627.
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respects, the interests of those within the single class are not aligned.
Most saliently, for the currently injured, the critical goal is generous
immediate payments. That goal tugs against the interest of exposure-
only plaintiffs in ensuring an ample, inflation-protected fund for the
future."46 The fact that there was "no assurance here-either in the
terms of the settlement or in the structure of the negotiations-that
the named plaintiffs operated under a proper understanding of their
representational responsibilities" was one of the reasons that the
Court rejected the class settlement.47  The impact of the
representative nature of class actions upon personal jurisdiction is the
subject of the next section.
B. A Brief Overview of Personal Jurisdiction Principles
As Professor Mullenix has observed, personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence has tended to focus on due process concerns as they
relate to the defendant a.4  Indeed, in a traditional two-party lawsuit in
which a single plaintiff sues a single defendant, personal jurisdiction
issues typically arise only with respect to the defendant because the
plaintiff is deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction by
electing to file suit.49 Interestingly, the Supreme Court has not drawn
distinctions in its due process-personal jurisdiction analysis between
defendants who are residents of other states and defendants who are
residents of foreign countries. Indeed, the Court's personal
jurisdiction cases have regularly used the word "foreign" in describing
both other states and other countries," and the Court has employed
the same minimum contacts test in evaluating whether personal
jurisdiction exists over a non-U.S. defendant.51
46. Id. at 626.
47. Id. at 627-28; see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 & n.31
(1999) (discussing the importance of adequate representation in class action
settlement).
48. Mullenix, Mass Tort, supra note 37, at 887 (noting that "personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence has, for fifty years .... exclusively focused on defendants' due process
concerns"); see also Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1272
(9th Cir. 1981) (noting that "[t]he law of personal jurisdiction ... is asymmetrical"
and "[t]he primary concern is for the burden on a defendant").
49. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984) (holding that a
plaintiff is not required to have "minimum contacts" with the forum; by filing suit, the
plaintiff has consented to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over her); see also
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984) (same); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 412 n.5 (1984) (holding that a plaintiff is not required
to have minimum contacts with the forum).
50. See, e.g., Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 (using "foreign corporation" to describe
both a U.S. entity and a non-U.S. entity); Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774 n.4 (including any
nonresident corporation in the term "foreign corporation"); Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (including any tribunal outside the defendant's home state in the
term "foreign tribunal"); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957)
(including any nonresident corporation in the term "foreign corporations").
51. See, e.g., Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 413-18 (applying minimum contacts test to
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1. Defendants and Personal Jurisdiction
With respect to defendants, the United States Supreme Court has
imposed a minimum contacts analysis,2 looking to the relationship
between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,53 reflecting
purposeful availment,54  reasonableness,55  and fairness.56  The
relationship of the defendant's forum contacts to the plaintiff's claim
also plays a role in the minimum contacts analysis:
When a controversy is related to or "arises out of" a defendant's
contacts with the forum .... a "relationship among the defendant,
the forum, and the litigation" is the essential foundation of in
personam jurisdiction. Even when the cause of action does not arise
out of or relate to the foreign [defendant's] activities in the forum
State, due process is not offended by a State's subjecting the
[defendant] to its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient
contacts between the State and the foreign [defendant].57
Consent also plays a role in personal jurisdiction. Even absent
minimum contacts, personal jurisdiction will still be found if the
defendant expressly or implicitly consents to suit in the forum state.58
non-U.S. corporation); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445
(1952) (same).
52. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that "due
process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam,
if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
notions of fair play or substantial justice") (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted); id. at 319 ("[The Due Process] clause does not contemplate that a state may
make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant
with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.").
53. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (noting that the "central
concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction" involves "the relationship among
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation").
54. See, e.g., Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 ("[I]t is essential in each case that there be
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.").
55. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
56. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (a
plurality opinion in which eight of the Justices agreed that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the foreign defendant would be "unreasonable and unfair,"
regardless of whether the minimum contacts test was satisfied).
57. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)
(quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204) (internal citation and footnote omitted). The
assertion of personal jurisdiction when the lawsuit arises out of, or is related to, the
defendant's forum contacts is called "specific jurisdiction." Id. at 414 n.8. The
assertion of personal jurisdiction when the lawsuit does not arise out of or is not
related to the defendant's forum contacts is called "general jurisdiction." Id. at 414
n.9.
58. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
703 (1982) (discussing "constructive consent" and noting, "[b]ecause the requirement
of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an individual right, it can, like other such
rights, be waived").
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The minimum contacts doctrine is not well-defined, and a
consistent, comprehensive approach to analyzing the existence of
minimum contacts simply does not exist. Rather than providing a
thorough analytical framework, the Supreme Court has instead
approached each case on its own facts, and the Court's explanations
have been too conclusory to offer effective guidance.
The Supreme Court first articulated the concept of minimum
contacts nearly sixty years ago in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington:59 "[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."'60
Various factors for evaluating the sufficiency of a defendant's
contacts with the forum state have been chiseled from International
Shoe, including the "nature and quality" of the contacts with the
forum state,61 an "estimate of the inconveniences" of litigating in the
forum state,62 whether the contacts are "continuous and systematic,"
"single or isolated," or "irregular [or] casual, '63 whether exercising
jurisdiction would promote "the fair and orderly administration of the
laws,"'  whether the defendant has "enjoy[ed] the benefits and
protection of the laws of [the forum] state,' 65 and whether the
contacts are related or unrelated to the claim.66 These largely vague,
and heavily fact-specific, considerations rendered the determination
of personal jurisdiction ambiguous and unpredictable.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have provided additional
descriptions and illustrations, but the precise parameters of personal
jurisdiction remain amorphous, and predictions regarding when
personal jurisdiction will-or will not-exist cannot be made with
certainty. However, the Court has introduced additional descriptive
factors into the personal jurisdiction evaluation, most notably
pertaining to the purposefulness of the contacts, the foreseeability of
subsequent litigation, and the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction.
In Hanson v. Denckla,67 the Supreme Court set forth the enduring
59. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
60. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
61. Id. at 318.
62. Id. at 317 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
63. Id. at 317,320.
64. Id. at 319.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 317 ("'Presence' in the state ... has never been doubted when the
activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but
also give rise to the liabilities sued on .... Conversely it has been generally
recognized that .. . single or isolated ... activities in a state in the corporation's behalf
are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with the activities
there." (internal citations omitted)).
67. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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prerequisite of purposeful availment: "[I]t is essential in each case that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."6
Purposeful availment requires that the defendant's contacts with
the forum state were "purposefully directed"69 rather than contacts
resulting from the "unilateral activity of another party or a third
person,"70  or from contacts that are random, fortuitous, or
attenuated.71  "Jurisdiction is proper.., where the contacts
proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a
'substantial connection' with the forum State. '72
With respect to foreseeability, the Court has consistently held that
the foreseeability of causing injury in another state is not a "sufficient
benchmark" for personal jurisdiction. 73  Rather, "the foreseeability
that is critical to due process analysis ... is that the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. 74
The Court has described the Due Process Clause as "protect[ing] an
individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding
judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful
'contacts, ties, or relations.' 75  A defendant's contacts with a
particular state serve as a type of "fair warning" that his activities may
subject him to that state's jurisdiction. 76  "[T]his fair warning
requirement is satisfied if the defendant has purposefully directed his
activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from
alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities. 77
In the context of non-U.S. defendants, the Supreme Court has
applied the same minimum contacts analysis, and has observed that,
depending upon the facts, either specific jurisdiction or general
jurisdiction may exist. 78 The lack of any analytical distinction between
68. Id. at 253.
69. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
70. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984).
71. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980).
72. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (quoting McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220, 223 (1957)).
73. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295.
74. Id. at 297.
75. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471-72 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
76. Id. at 472 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
77. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
78. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) ("Even
when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign corporation's
activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a State's subjecting the
corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between
the State and the foreign corporation." (footnote omitted)); Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952) (finding that an Ohio court's exercise of
2003]
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U.S. and non-U.S. defendants with respect to due process and
personal jurisdiction may be due, in large part, to our system of state
sovereignty. As Professor Hazard has observed:
The jurisdictional problem in the United States is distinctive
because, while the country is socially and economically essentially a
unitary state, legally and politically it is in many respects a
federation of distinct polities.... The peculiar features of the
jurisdictional problem in the United States, then, is that our national
economic and social unity is conducive to the full panoply of
substantive transactions found internally in a unitary state but our
political plurality requires a choice of law and jurisdictional rules as
among separate sovereigns.79
Even after determining that the defendant has satisfied the
minimum contacts test, the defendant's contacts "may be considered
in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal
jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and substantial justice."'8
Accordingly, courts in "appropriate case[s]" may examine "the
burden on the defendant,"8 "the forum State's interest in adjudicating
the dispute,"8 "the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief,"83 "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining
the most efficient resolution of controversies,"' and "the shared
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies."85 In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,86 a
splintered Court, issuing a plurality opinion, nevertheless had eight
Justices in agreement that an additional reasonableness factor comes
into play when a defendant is not merely from a different state, but
instead is from a foreign country: "The unique burdens placed upon
one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have
significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the
long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders. '87
Despite Supreme Court pronouncements in numerous cases,88 the
general jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation was "reasonable and just" where
the corporation's president "ha[d] been carrying on in Ohio a continuous and
systematic, but limited, part of its general business").
79. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965
Sup. Ct. Rev. 241, 246-47.
80. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 320 (1945)).
81. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
87. Id. at 114; see also id. at 115 ("[A] court [must] consider the procedural and
substantive policies of other nations whose interests are affected by the assertion of
jurisdiction by the [forum state].").
88. See, e.g., Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102; Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
(1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); World-
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concept of minimum contacts remains vague and difficult to apply
under the best of circumstances.89 Different issues arise, however,
when examining personal jurisdiction with respect to plaintiffs.
2. Plaintiffs and Personal Jurisdiction
With respect to plaintiffs, the minimum contacts test is unnecessary
in a traditional non-class lawsuit.9' By filing the lawsuit, the plaintiff
effectively has consented to the forum's assertion of personal
jurisdiction over her.91 The ability to consent to personal jurisdiction
means that a plaintiff-like a defendant-may consent to jurisdiction
even absent minimum contacts with the forum.92
In the more difficult context of class litigation, personal jurisdiction
issues become thornier. "It is, after all, one thing to say that a court
may bind persons without formally making them parties, but quite
another to accord a state 'the ability to affect the legal relations of
persons' who have no contact with it." 93  In traditional non-class
litigation, all plaintiffs are named and personally participate in the
lawsuit, and therefore to hold that such plaintiffs have consented to
the court's jurisdiction seems appropriate. However, in class litigation
involving a plaintiff class, the vast majority of plaintiffs are unnamed
and do not personally participate-which is the very reason that class
litigation is economical. For those members of a prospective plaintiff
Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 286 (1980); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957); see generally Borchers, Death of Personal Jurisdiction, supra note
20, at 19 (tracing the Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction cases).
89. See Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State
Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 77 [hereinafter Brilmayer, Contacts Count]
(discussing difficulties in resolving "how contacts count"); Hazard, supra note 79, at
283 ("[T]he vagueness of the minimum-contacts general principle can make
jurisdictional litigation uncertain at the trial level and frequent at the appellate
level."); Rex R. Perschbacher, Foreword, Fifty Years of International Shoe: The Past
and Future of Personal Jurisdiction, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 513, 514 (1995) (noting
"the vagueness of the minimum-contacts general principle").
90. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1983) ("[W]e have
not to date required a plaintiff to have 'minimum contacts' with the forum State
before permitting that State to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant. On the contrary, we have upheld the assertion of jurisdiction where such
contacts were entirely lacking.").
91. See Linda Sandstrom Simard, Exploring the Limits of Specific Personal
Jurisdiction, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 1619, 1659 (2001) ("In filing the complaint against the
defendant, the plaintiff impliedly consents to personal jurisdiction in that court."); see
also Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938) ("The plaintiff having, by his
voluntary act in demanding justice from the defendant, submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court, there is nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in treating him as
being there for all purposes for which justice to the defendant requires his
presence.").
92. See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780-81 (upholding plaintiff's choice of forum on a
consent theory, despite plaintiff's lack of any connection to New Hampshire).
93. Note, Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions: Jurisdiction and Certification, 92 Harv.
L. Rev. 718, 724 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions].
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
class who are not class representatives, the reason for finding implied
consent in non-class litigation-the plaintiff's intentional choice to file
a lawsuit in a specific court-does not exist. Therefore a court cannot
automatically assume that absent class members are willing to consent
to the court's jurisdiction. The question then becomes how personal
jurisdiction is satisfied in the class action context.
The major Supreme Court decision addressing personal jurisdiction
in the class action context is Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.9 4 The
Shutts case is of particular importance because the class action at issue
included foreign claimants. However, aside from mentioning that the
class included claimants from foreign countries, the Court made no
further mention of the foreign claimants in the opinion." Although
this would seem to suggest that the Court regarded the foreign
claimants as adding nothing to jurisdictional due process analysis,
such a conclusion is flawed, as explained in Part 111.96
Shutts was a (b)(3)-type class action filed in Kansas state court by
gas company investors seeking to recover interest on delayed royalty
payments.97 The 28,000-plus member class resided "in all 50 States,
the District of Columbia, and several foreign countries,"" and class
members had an average claim of $100.9 9
94. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
95. One might have wondered whether the presence of foreign claimants would
introduce principles of international law into the personal jurisdiction analysis. See
Strauss, supra note 7, at 374 for "a model that describes the role of international law
in governing a state's assertion of jurisdiction in civil cases involving foreign
defendants or plaintiffs." However, the fact that the Supreme Court ignored the
foreign claimants would seem to suggest that the Court considers international law to
play no role in determinations of personal jurisdiction.
96. See infra notes 125-220 and accompanying text (examining impact of non-U.S.
claimants upon due process considerations).
97. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 799. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 requires the class
to satisfy the four prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy
of representation set forth in subdivision (a), as well as the requirements for one or
more of the types of classes set out in subdivision (b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)-
(4), (b); see generally 7A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure §§ 1762-66, at 151-98 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing Rule 23(a)
prerequisites); Debra Lyn Bassett, Pre-Certification Communication Ethics in Class
Actions, 36 Ga. L. Rev. 353, 359-67 (2002) (discussing class action procedural
requirements under Rule 23). A Rule 23(b)(3) class requires that questions of law or
fact common to the class predominate over questions affecting only individual
members, and that the class action is a superior method for obtaining a fair and
efficient adjudication of such issues. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); see 1 Newberg & Conte,
supra note 25, § 4.20, at 4-71 ("[S]ubdivision (b)(3) is general so that it comprehends
all class actions .... ). Rule 23(b)(3) lists four non-exhaustive factors for the court to
consider in determining whether class action treatment would be superior: (1) the
interest of class members in individually controlling the litigation; (2) the extent and
nature of any ongoing litigation; (3) the desirability of concentrating litigation in a
particular forum; and (4) the difficulties in managing a class action. Id.
98. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 799. Although the Shutts class action clearly encompassed
class members from other countries, the Supreme Court did not discuss the due
process implications of having non-U.S. citizens among the class members. Indeed,
this particular quote is the only place in the Shutts opinion at which the Court
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The defendant, whose loss in the Kansas trial court was affirmed by
the Kansas Supreme Court, challenged the judgment on due process
and choice of law grounds before the United States Supreme Court.100
The Court rejected the defendant's due process contention, which is
the issue of particular interest for this Article, but sustained the
defendant's choice of law argument.'
Phillips Petroleum had argued that out-of-state class members
could not be deemed to have consented to jurisdiction merely by their
failure to opt out of the class, and therefore personal jurisdiction
existed over those out-of-state plaintiffs only if they had minimum
contacts with the State of Kansas.'012 Without those minimum
contacts, the defendant argued, Kansas had "exceeded its
jurisdictional reach and thereby violated the due process rights of the
absent plaintiffs."'0 3 Approximately ninety-seven percent of the class
had no pre-litigation nexus with Kansas."°'
A unanimous Court first held that Phillips Petroleum had standing
to raise the jurisdictional issue with respect to the out-of-state class
members.
As a class-action defendant petitioner is in a unique predicament. If
Kansas does not possess jurisdiction over this plaintiff class,
petitioner will be bound to 28,100 judgment holders scattered across
the globe, but none of these will be bound by the Kansas decree.
Petitioner could be subject to numerous later individual suits by
these class members because a judgment issued without proper
personal jurisdiction over an absent party is not entitled to full faith
and credit elsewhere and thus has no res judicata effect as to that
party. Whether it wins or loses on the merits, petitioner has a
distinct and personal interest in seeing the entire plaintiff class
bound by res judicata just as petitioner is bound. The only way a
class action defendant like petitioner can assure itself of this binding
effect of the judgment is to ascertain that the forum court has
jurisdiction over every plaintiff whose claim it seeks to adjudicate,
sufficient to support a defense of res judicata in a later suit for
damages by class members. 10 5
The Court went on to distinguish the kinds of concerns
necessitating a minimum contacts analysis with respect to defendants,
from the situation presented by absent plaintiffs in a class action. The
Court observed that absent class members are "not haled anywhere to
referred to the existence of non-U.S. class members.
99. Id. at 801.
100. Id. at 799.
101. Id. The Kansas court had held that Kansas law applied to all of the
transactions, and as to this point the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for
further proceedings. Id. at 799, 823.
102. Id. at 806.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 801.
105. Id. at 805.
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defend themselves upon pain of a default judgment."'' 6 Instead, the
court and the class representatives protect the interests of absent class
members. 10 7
[Absent class members] need not hire counsel or appear. They are
almost never subject to counterclaims or cross-claims, or liability for
fees or costs. Absent plaintiff class members are not subject to
coercive or punitive remedies. Nor will an adverse judgment
typically bind an absent plaintiff for any damages, although a valid
adverse judgment may extinguish any of the plaintiff's claims which
were litigated.0 8
Accordingly, the Court found that absent class plaintiffs, while
entitled to "some" Fourteenth Amendment protection, 10 9 are not
necessarily entitled to as much protection as a defendant." 0
Limiting its holding to class actions involving "known plaintiffs"
seeking "wholly or predominantly... money judgments,"'11 the Court
stated that in order to bind such an absent plaintiff, "minimal
procedural due process protection" must have been provided."2 This
"minimal" protection mirrors the prerequisites already established by
Rule 23 for (b)(3) classes-notice, an opportunity to be heard, an
opportunity to opt out, and interests adequately represented by the
named plaintiff.'
106. Id. at 809.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 810.
109. Id. at 811 ("The Fourteenth Amendment does protect 'persons,' not
'defendants,'... so absent plaintiffs as well as absent defendants are entitled to some
protection from the jurisdiction of a forum State which seeks to adjudicate their
claims.").
110. Id. ("Because States place fewer burdens upon absent class plaintiffs than they
do upon absent defendants in nonclass suits, the Due Process Clause need not and
does not afford the former as much protection from state-court jurisdiction as it does
the latter.").
111. Id. at 811 n.3 ("Our holding today is limited to those class actions which seek
to bind known plaintiffs concerning claims wholly or predominately for money
judgments. We intimate no view concerning other types of class actions, such as those
seeking equitable relief ... .
112. Id. at 811-12.
113. Id. at 812. The court stated:
The plaintiff must receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and
participate in the litigation, whether in person or through counsel. The
notice must be the best practicable, "reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."... The notice
should describe the action and the plaintiffs' rights in it. Additionally, we
hold that due process requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be
provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by executing
and returning an "opt out" or "request for exclusion" form to the court.
Finally, the Due Process Clause of course requires that the named plaintiff
at all times adequately represent the interests of the absent class members.
Id. (citations omitted).
If the district court determines that the lawsuit should proceed as a Rule 23(b)(3)
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Thus, Shutts effectively concluded that the procedural safeguards
built into the federal class action device under Rule 23 already
afforded sufficient due process protections for (b)(3) class actions.
Since a finding that all absent plaintiff class members would be subject
to the same minimum contacts test as defendants would effectively
have eliminated nationwide class actions, the result in Shutts was an
eminently practical one. 14
Accordingly, plaintiff class members, like individual plaintiffs
generally, are not necessarily required to demonstrate the existence of
"minimum contacts" with the forum. " ' In Shutts, there was no
minimum contacts basis for personal jurisdiction over the absent
plaintiff class members. However, by providing absent class members
with the opportunity to opt out of (b)(3) class litigation, the Shutts
decision essentially premised personal jurisdiction upon the consent
of class members" 6-the corollary of plaintiff consent in traditional
class action and certifies the class as such, the court must then direct to the potential
class members "the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). The class representatives bear the expense of providing this
notice. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172 (1974). The cost of
providing individual notice can be great indeed when the proposed class is large. See
id. at 167 (noting that "individual notice to all identifiable class members would cost
$225,000, and additional expense would be incurred for suitable publication notice
designed to reach the other four million class members"). The notice must inform
(b)(3) class members that they may request exclusion from the class and that the class
action judgment will bind them if they do not request exclusion. Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(2). Providing this notice and opportunity to "opt out" of the class action is
mandatory for classes certified under subdivision (b)(3). Classes certified under
subdivisions (b)(1) or (b)(2), however, usually are not provided the option of
excluding themselves from the lawsuit. See 7B Wright & Miller, supra note 97, §
1793, at 295 ("[I]n these cases notice by the court theoretically is discretionary
only."). The court may elect, in its discretion, to direct notice to subdivision (b)(1) or
(b)(2) class members "for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for
the fair conduct of the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2). Similarly, Rule 23(d)(5)
provides discretionary authority for the court to afford (b)(1) and (b)(2) class
members with the opportunity to opt out "when necessary to facilitate the fair and
efficient conduct of the litigation." Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 96 (D.C. Cir.
1997). The Kansas state rule differed, however, from Federal Rule 23-under the
Kansas class action rule, opt-out rights were discretionary. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-
223(c)(2) (1994).
114. The Court rejected the defendant's argument that due process required absent
class plaintiffs to affirmatively opt into the class, making the practical observation that
such a requirement would invalidate "scores of state statutes [as well as] the class-
action provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Shutts, 472 U.S. at 813.
115. See id. at 811 ("[W]e hold that a forum State may exercise jurisdiction over the
claim of an absent class-action plaintiff, even though that plaintiff may not possess the
minimum contacts with the forum which would support personal jurisdiction over a
defendant.").
116. See id. at 813-14; see also Kahan & Silberman, supra note 40, at 766 n.3
("Shutts itself discussed the opt out requirement in a situation where there was no
basis for personal jurisdiction over absent class members and construed a failure to
opt out of a class suit as consent to personal jurisdiction."); Patrick Woolley,
Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 571, 580 n.38
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non-class lawsuits. In providing an opt-out option, Shutts concluded
that absent plaintiff class members who do not elect to opt out have,
in essence, consented to participate in the class litigation.
11 7
The issues left unresolved by Shutts-the due process requirements
when class plaintiffs are unknown or when the action is not "wholly or
predominantly" seeking monetary damages-remain unresolved.118
Subsequent federal courts have concluded that Shutts applies to
federal actions based on Rule 23 as well as state actions.119 Absent
additional guidance, some courts have concluded that (b)(1) and
(b)(2) classes, even without opt out provisions, do not violate due
process. 12' Hybrid class actions seeking both equitable and monetary
relief have caused more consternation, but courts generally have
applied a literal reading of Shutts, focusing on whether the relief
sought involved wholly or predominately money damages; and if so,
(1997) [hereinafter Woolley, Rethinking Adequate Representation] ("Shutts construes
a failure to opt out of a class suit as consent to personal jurisdiction. Thus, the right
to opt out may be limited to absent class members who do not have minimum
contacts with the forum.").
117. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 813 (absent plaintiff class members are "presumed to
consent" to jurisdiction if they do not opt out of the class); Arthur R. Miller & David
Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 Yale L.J. 1, 16 (1986) (stating that the reasoning in Shutts
"was based upon the inference of consent from class members' failure to opt out");
see John E. Kennedy, The Supreme Court Meets the Bride of Frankenstein: Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts and the State Multistate Class Action, 34 U. Kan. L. Rev. 255
(1985) [hereinafter Kennedy, Bride of Frankenstein] (analyzing the consent theory
presented in Shutts); see also 3 Newberg & Conte, supra note 25, § 13.37, at 13-105
(stating that the "suggest[ion] that the failure of class members to opt out of the suit
equals consent to jurisdiction.., does not withstand analysis").
118. The Supreme Court has declined recent opportunities to provide additional
guidance with respect to due process and the right to opt out of class litigation. See
Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83 (1997) (dismissing writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted because the federal constitutional issue was not properly
presented to the state supreme court); Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 118
(1994) (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted because the case "would
require [the Court] to resolve a constitutional question that may be entirely
hypothetical").
119. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 1002 n.19 (5th Cir. 1996) (Smith, J.,
dissenting) (collecting cases), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); see also Mullenix, Mass Tort, supra note 37, at 896 (noting
that "the lower federal courts have grappled with the applicability of Shutts in federal
as opposed to state actions, generally concluding the Shutts due process
pronouncements apply equally in federally based Rule 23 class actions, although on
various grounds"); see also Miller & Crump, supra note 117, at 31 ("It seems
doubtful ... that federal courts should be excused from requirements that Shutts
declares fundamental to due process.").
120. See, e.g., In re Louisiana-Pacific Corp. Derivative Litig., 705 A.2d 238, 240
(Del. Ch. 1997) ("[U]nder Rule 23(b)(1) or (2) the close identity of interests of the
absent class members with those of the members before the court and satisfaction of
the Subsection 23(a) criteria are sufficient to satisfy due process of law ......
Williams v. Lane, 129 F.R.D. 636, 638-43 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (upholding (b)(2) class).
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requiring an opt out opportunity, and if not, finding an opportunity to
opt out was not required.21
Commentators have been more difficult to placate. Reactions to
the unresolved due process issues have ranged from acceptance of
adequate representation alone as providing due process in (b)(1) and
(b)(2) classes, 22 to insistence that all class members in any type of
class litigation have a right to notice and an opportunity to be heard, 123
to assertions of a right to opt out from mandatory classes. 24 The next
section addresses Shutts' shortcomings in providing due process
guidance in the transnational class action context.
II. DUE PROCESS IN THE TRANSNATIONAL CLASS ACTION CONTEXT
UNDER SHUTTS
The Supreme Court's guidance in Shutts with respect to personal
jurisdiction in class actions tends to fall short in a number of respects.
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes both
plaintiff classes and defendant classes, 25 which raise different personal
jurisdiction concerns. 126 Yet Shutts expressly declined to provide any
guidance for defendant classes, or, for that matter, (b)(1) or (b)(2)
classes. 127  Moreover, a transnational class raises any number of
specialized due process concerns, as contrasted with a class comprised
solely of U.S. citizens. However, despite facing a class with foreign
claimants, Shutts completely ignored the impact of their presence.12 1
This Section addresses Shutts' various shortcomings in analyzing
personal jurisdiction concerns in transnational class actions.
121. See, e.g., White v. Nat'l Football League, 836 F. Supp. 1458, 1471-73 (D. Minn.
1993) (approving (b)(1) settlement); Williams v. Burlington N., Inc., 832 F.2d 100,
103-04 (7th Cir. 1987) (approving (b)(2) consent decree).
122. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Due Process of Law in Trilateral Disputes, 78 Iowa
L. Rev. 1011 (1993) (accepting the proposition that class members are bound if
adequate representation has been accorded).
123. See, e.g., Woolley, Rethinking Adequate Representation, supra note 116, at 573
("[E]very class member whose whereabouts or identity can be reasonably ascertained
has a constitutionally protected right to prosecute his cause of action by presenting
evidence and making legal arguments not otherwise before the court.").
124. See Steven T.O. Cottreau, The Due Process Right to Opt Out of Class Actions,
73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 480 (1998).
125. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) ("One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all .... ") (emphasis added).
126. 1 Newberg & Conte, supra note 25, § 4.46, at 4-183 ("What constitutes
procedural fairness necessarily varies in different litigation contexts, so that
procedure required by due process will vary in traditional non-class litigation, in
plaintiff class actions, and in defendant class suits.").
127. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 n.3 (1985).
128. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing Shutts' failure to address
due process implications for non-U.S. claimants).
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A. Plaintiff Classes
With respect to plaintiff classes, the Shutts Court provided guidance
for determining whether sufficient due process protections exist to
bind absent class members in a single context: For known plaintiff
class members seeking wholly or predominantly monetary relief, there
must be notice, an opportunity to be heard, an opportunity to opt out,
and adequate representation in order to satisfy the minimum due
process requirements. 1
29
However, due process raises particular challenges when absent class
members are not just outside the state, but instead are from outside
the nation. The notion of fundamental fairness sufficient to bind non-
citizens in another country to a U.S. judgment is one warranting
careful examination. A transnational class implicates the laws and
legal systems of two or more different nations, and each nation has its
own distinct legal system and procedures. 30 In particular, the class
action device is unique; most foreign nations do not have a similar
procedure.' In addition, other countries' notions of personal
jurisdiction often differ from that of the United States. 3 2
129. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811-12 & n.3.
130. See William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified
and Uncodified), 60 La. L. Rev. 677, 681 (2000) ("[T]here are one federal and fifty
state legal systems in the United States, separate legal systems in each of the other
nations, and still other distinct legal systems in such organizations as the European
Economic Community and the United Nations.").
131. See Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Finding an Appropriate Compromise:
A Comparative Study of Individualistic Models and Group Rights in Civil Procedure, 2
Civ. Just. Q. 111, 134 (1983) (class actions are not found outside of common law
countries); Richard 0. Faulk, Armageddon Through Aggregation? The Use and
Abuse of Class Actions in International Dispute Resolution, 10 Mich. St. U.-DCL J.
Int'l L. 205, 229 n.84 (2001) (summarizing class action and group action laws and
initiatives in the European Commission); Linda S. Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad:
Complexity and Convergence, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2001) ("Almost all civil law
countries, as well as England (a common law country), do not have a class action
procedure."); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Debates Over Group Litigation in Comparative
Perspective: What Can We Learn From Each Other?, 11 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 157,
157-58 (2001) ("Only a few other nations have adopted the class action device even
to a limited extent; and in many countries, particularly the civil law systems of
continental Europe, resistance to the class action is strong, and responses to
widespread-injury problems are sometimes limited."); id. at 159 ("Some forms of class
action have been adopted in a few Canadian provinces, in Australia, and in Brazil.");
see also S. Stuart Clark & Christina Harris, Multi-Plaintiff Litigation in Australia: A
Comparative Perspective, 11 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 289 (2001) (discussing
Australia's system). See generally supra note 5 (discussing unique nature of class
action device).
132. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the United
States and the European Community: Lessons for American Reform, 40 Am. J. Comp.
L. 121, 133-36 (1992) (analyzing Brussels Convention and concluding that European
countries do not permit personal jurisdiction based on continuous and systematic
business contacts with the forum); Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and
the Hague Treaty, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 89, 114-16 (1999) (noting that most other
countries do not respect a U.S. judgment that was based on broad notions of personal
jurisdiction, such as general jurisdiction); Jason Farber, NAFTA and Personal
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Accordingly, from the very outset of the litigation, there must be an
awareness of the international component and the concomitant
implications.
Assuming a (b)(3) plaintiff class, thus governed by Shutts, absent
class members whose identities are known would be entitled to notice
and an opportunity to be heard, an opportunity to opt out, and
interests adequately represented by the named plaintiff.133 All of
these protections, however, require additional precautions in
transnational class actions. 134 Assuming a (b)(1) or (b)(2) class, the
only mandatory due process protection currently afforded is that of
Jurisdiction: A Look at the Requirements for Obtaining Personal Jurisdiction in the
Three Signatory Nations, 19 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 449, 456-65 (1997)
(explaining differences in bases for personal jurisdiction in Mexico and Canada);
Walter W. Heiser, A "Minimum Interest" Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 35 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 915, 957 n.205 (2000) ("[T]he United States and Europe have very
different views as to the proper exercise of personal jurisdiction."); id. (noting that
the United States is "more expansive with respect to assertions [of personal
jurisdiction] based on general jurisdiction and transient jurisdiction"). For a
discussion of every country's judicial system and personal jurisdiction requirements,
see 1 Modern Legal System Cyclopedia (Kenneth Robert Redden ed., 1989).
133. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812.
134. In other contexts, foreign citizens have been subject to reduced due process
protections. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212
(1953) (nonresident aliens seeking admittance to the United States are not entitled to
the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause); Fierro v. INS, 81 F. Supp. 2d
167, 168 (D. Mass. 1999) ("In recent years, Congress has been busily 'cutting down'
the procedural protections of our laws as they may relate to resident aliens, the better
swiftly to deport those whom it considers undesirable due to certain prior criminal
convictions."). However, reduced constitutional protection
is plainly inappropriate when determining limits on the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction. As most courts have concluded, the full protection of the Due
Process Clause should be available to foreign citizens summoned to defend
themselves in United States courts. It would be unfair and ironic to hale an
alien into an unfamiliar United States court, forcing him to litigate according
to our procedures and laws, yet deny him the protections of the Due Process
Clause on the grounds that he is an alien.
Born, Reflections, supra note 7, at 21-22.
In the context of personal jurisdiction, Professor Brilmayer has noted that the
petition for certiorari in Helicopteros "specifically presented the question of whether
the due process clause afforded less protection to alien nonresident defendants than
to domestic ones. In ignoring that question completely, the [Supreme] Court
implicitly answered it in the negative." Brilmayer, American Federal System, supra
note 29, at 291 (emphasis omitted). In light of the host of issues implicated by the
presence of non-U.S. claimants in class litigation, including the potential loss of
property rights, see infra notes 195-220 and accompanying text, non-U.S. claimants
necessarily are entitled to the same general due process protections as U.S.
claimants-including notice, the opportunity to be heard, and adequacy of
representation. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811-12. In addition, this Article asserts that
non-U.S. claimants should be required to affirmatively opt into class litigation-
rather than construing the failure to opt out as constituting consent-due to the
unique concerns arising when non-U.S. claimants participate in class litigation. See
infra notes 226-41 and accompanying text (discussing consent and the necessity of
permitting non-U.S. claimants to affirmatively opt into class litigation).
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adequate representation,135 which, as one of the protections just
noted, also presents additional considerations in the transnational
context. Moreover, in transnational class litigation, additional legal,
geographical, language, cultural, or logistical factors-including time
differences, mail delays, and transportation difficulty and expense-
may impact upon the practical realities of due process.
1. Notice
Due process requires that the class action notice "be the best
practicable, 'reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action .... The
notice should describe the action and the plaintiffs' rights in it."' 36 As
a practical matter, notice consists of a legal notice mailed to potential
class members. However,
[t]he Court's inference of consent in Shutts depended upon the
assumption that notice would communicate effectively to claimants
their rights and options. Much of what lawyers write, however,
including many class action notices, is incomprehensible to average
citizens. The lawyerly concern for completeness and accuracy may
conflict with the objective of intelligibility. 137
The notice usually is in small print, and typically is lengthy and
detailed, often containing legal jargon and always containing legal
references.13 The notice is, in short, overwhelming, intimidating, and
incomprehensible to many, perhaps most, of its recipients. 39
135. See In re Louisiana-Pacific Corp. Derivative Litig., 705 A.2d 238, 240 (Del. Ch.
1997) (in (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions, "the close identity of interests of the absent
class members with those of the members before the court and satisfaction of the
Subsection 23(a) criteria are sufficient to satisfy due process of law").
136. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812.
137. Miller & Crump, supra note 117, at 22.
138. See Judith Resnik, Litigating and Settling Class Actions: The Prerequisites of
Entry and Exit, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 835, 855 (1997) ("In the set of class actions the
F[ederal] J[udicial] C[enter] Class Action Study considered,... the notices that were
provided often lacked important information and were jargon-filled .... ). As this
Article was going to press, proposed amendments to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were pending and the "Class Action Fairness Act of 2003" had
passed the House of Representatives. See House Passes Class Action Fairness Act,
Bill Would Expand Federal Court Jurisdiction, 71 U.S.L.W. 2789, 2789-90 (June 17,
2003). One of the proposed amendments to Rule 23(c) would require "plain, easily
understood language" in the class notice. See http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
comment2002/8-01CV.pdf, at 9 (last visited July 19, 2003). The proposed Class
Action Fairness Act would create, among other provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1715, which
would require clearer and simpler language in any written notice concerning a
proposed class action settlement. H.R. 1115, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 12, 2003).
Even if these proposals take effect, however, the problems for non-U.S. claimants
concerning language and unfamiliarity with the class action device discussed infra will
remain. See infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text (discussing language and
unfamiliarity issues for non-U.S. claimants).
139. See Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The Constitutional Limits of
Judicial Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under
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Faced with a piece of paper they do not understand, the vast
majority of the recipients are not going to consult an attorney for
advice. Nor are they going to take the time and effort to draft a letter
opting out of the litigation. They are simply going to set the notice
aside or throw it away without realizing the consequences of their
inaction. 140 Indeed, it is
beyond the experience or expectation of reasonable citizens that the
failure to respond to what looks like a slightly unusual piece of junk
mail constitutes assent to the solicitation... by self-selected counsel
desiring to represent the recipient .... If implied consent is to be
derived solely from failure to respond to class notices, courts will
have to be a good deal more vigilant than they have been in
scrutinizing the content of these notices.141
As unintelligible as a legal notice may seem to a U.S. citizen, a
foreign citizen is likely to find it even more so. Language issues can
Federal Rule 23, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 461, 466 n.35 (1997) ("The likelihood that a class
member will actually receive and comprehend the notice of the action is in every case
very small."); Arthur R. Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D.
313, 321 (1973) ("The sad truth is that notices issued by courts or attorneys typically
are much too larded with legal jargon to be understood by the average citizen.");
Miller & Crump, supra note 117, at 17 (observing that class action notices "are
notoriously poorly understood"); Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and
Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1148, 1185
(1998) ("Class notices are complex, all too often uninformative, and misleading."); id.
at 1186 (describing class action notices as "baroquely written"); Thomas E. Willging
et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74, 134 (1996) ("Our impression is that most [class action] notices are
not comprehensible to the lay reader.").
A good illustration of this ... is offered by the tetracycline cases. The
Attorney General of North Carolina sent notice of the action to citizens of
his state who had paid income taxes during a particular period. The theory
underlying this procedure was sound enough. Given the wide use of the
medication it was important to send notice to a broadly based list of citizens.
Some of the responses are worth reading because they are symptomatic of
the difficulty with the wording of most notices and reflect the problem of
communicating to lay people about legal matters.
Dear Mr. Clerk: I have your notice that I owe you $300 for selling drugs. I
have never sold any drugs, especially those you have listed; but I have sold a
little whiskey once in a while.
Dear Sir: I received this paper from you. I guess I really don't understand it,
but if I have been given one of those drugs, nobody told me why. If it means
what I think it does, I have not been with a man in nine years.
Dear Sir: I received your pamphlet on drugs, which I think will be of great
value to me in the future. I am unable to attend your class, however.
Dear Mr. Attorney General: I am sorry to say this, but you have the wrong
John Doe, because in 1954, I wasn't but three years old and didn't even have
a name. Mother named me when I got my driver's license. Up to then, they
just called me Baby Doe.
Miller, supra, at 321-22.
140. See Miller & Crump, supra note 117, at 17 ("[L]ay recipients [of class action
notices] may be tempted to throw them away because they give the false impression
that legal effects can be avoided by inaction.").
141. Monaghan, supra note 139, at 1185-86.
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arise when a non-English speaker receives a class action notice
printed in English.142 Language issues can also arise even when the
class action notice is printed in the foreign claimant's native language.
"As anyone who has ever tried to translate a document from a foreign
language knows, a literal word-by-word, or even sentence-by-
sentence, translation of a foreign document will at best confuse...
and at worst produce nonsense. "143
Unfamiliarity with the legal system generally, and with class actions
in particular, can also interfere with the foreign claimant's
comprehension of the class action notice.1" Class actions exist in few
jurisdictions outside the United States, so the class action concept may
be unknown to the foreign claimant.145  Thus, potential language
issues, unfamiliarity with the U.S. legal system, and the natural human
tendency to ignore that which we do not understand, all combine to
render notice potentially ineffectual for foreign claimants.
142. Indeed, confusion can result even when all are speaking the same language:
Notwithstanding the fact that Americans, Australians and the British think
they speak the same language, some interesting problems can arise before it
is realised [sic] that there are some very important differences. Some words
have a different meaning, some words are simply not understood, and some
expressions or language considered acceptable in one country may be
absolutely taboo in another.
S. Stuart Clark, Viewing the Global Attack on the Global Economy from Australia, 69
Def. Couns. J. 185, 192 (2002).
143. James A. Fanto, The Absence of Cross-Cultural Communication: SEC
Mandatory Disclosure and Foreign Corporate Governance, 17 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus.
119, 186 (1996); see also Kizuki Kuzuhara, Contracting Between a Japanese Enterprise
and an American Enterprise: The Differences in the Importance of Written Documents
as the Final Agreement in the United States and Japan, 3 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L. 57,
64-65 (1996).
[G]iven the hierarchy of languages in the context of international business
transactions, those who have English as the native language would have an
advantage over other parties unless the courts are willing to consider the
cultural differences in societies. What is also troublesome, is that in the
language context, some English words are used as is in Japanese which do
not have precisely the same meaning. For example, the word mansion in
English would describe a large expensive home. On the other hand, the
word mansion used as is in Japanese would describe something close to an
apartment house or a tenement house.
Id.
144. See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The
Injured Person's Access to Justice, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1567, 1604 (1993) (noting that in
England, "[ilnjured people, viewed as a group, are inexperienced in all aspects of
formal and informal legal proceedings"); see also id. at 1601-13, 1613-17 (discussing
differences between the U.S. legal system and the legal systems of England and
Australia, respectively).
145. See Richard H. Dreyfuss, Class Action Judgment Enforcement in Italy:
Procedural "Due Process" Requirements, 10 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 5, 7-8 (2002)
("[C]lass action devices can be found in very few foreign jurisdictions."); see also
supra notes 5, 131 (same).
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2. Opportunity to be Heard
"The plaintiff must receive ... an opportunity to be heard and
participate in the litigation, whether in person or through counsel."146
However, even for those recipients who are able to decipher the class
action notice, providing a foreign claimant with notice of the pending
class litigation does not immediately translate into an opportunity to
be heard. Retaining counsel in the location where the class litigation
is proceeding can be both difficult and expensive for a U.S. citizen
living within the country, but handling such a matter from outside the
U.S. is exponentially more so. 147  Geographical distance from the
courthouse, perhaps measured by oceans and continents-as well as
time zone differences, transportation expense, communication delays,
and other difficulties 14 8 -may render the ability to monitor and
participate in the class litigation nearly impossible. Attending court
proceedings, raising potential objections, consulting with local
counsel-even simply trying to stay informed of the litigation's
progress-are all particularly burdensome for foreign class
members.149
The opportunity to opt out and adequacy of representation are
interrelated. In the class action context, the opportunity to opt out
protects a plaintiff's interest in the individual control of his or her
litigation, 150 as well as protecting against distant forum abuse.'5 1
146. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,812 (1985).
147. See Born, International Civil Litigation, supra note 6, at 93.
Assertions of jurisdiction over foreign defendants often raise different issues
than assertions of jurisdiction over U.S. defendants from other states of the
Union. The inconvenience that results from requiring a defendant (or
plaintiff) to litigate in a foreign country is often greater than that resulting
from requiring an American to litigate in another part of the United States.
Major differences in procedural and substantive rules-such as the scope of
discovery, the existence of fee-shifting provisions or contingent fee
arrangements, and the right to a jury trial-are also more likely in the
international context. Moreover, a state court's assertion of judicial
jurisdiction over residents of another U.S. state virtually never provokes
retaliatory measures; in contrast, assertions of jurisdiction over foreign
defendants can result in retaliation from foreign nations.
Id.
148. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 142, at 191 (noting "the extraordinary distances
involved and the time zone differences" between the United States and Australia).
149. See id. at 192.
Time is always a problem. Not just a lack of time to do what must be done
but a lack of a common time to have a telephone conference. It is bad
enough when only two cities are involved, say New York and Sydney. At
least, this telephone conference can be scheduled at the beginning and the
end of each participant's day. Add a participant in Europe, however, and
someone will be out of bed very early or have [to] stay up very late ....
Id.
150. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) (Advisory Committee Note) (characterizing the right
to opt out as reflecting the strong interest of individuals in pursuing their own
litigation); see John E. Kennedy, Class Actions: The Right to Opt Out, 25 Ariz. L. Rev.
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Adequate representation goes to the protection of a plaintiff's interest
in this particular class litigation should the plaintiff elect not to opt
out but instead to remain in the class. Thus, adequate representation
protects the plaintiff who elects to remain in the class, while opting
out protects the plaintiff who would prefer not to remain in the class.
3. Adequate Representation
"[T]he Due Process Clause... requires that the named plaintiff at
all times adequately represent the interests of the absent class
members. 152  Indeed, "[a]dequacy of representation, rather than
notice, is the touchstone of due process in a class action, especially
one seeking primarily injunctive or declaratory relief for the class. 1 53
This benchmark protection154 is the protection least likely to exist
when class actions include citizens of other countries. The problems
inherent in adequacy of representation'55 are exacerbated when class
actions cross national borders.
Adequacy of representation bears heavy burdens in class litigation.
To satisfy due process, the named class representatives and class
counsel must adequately represent the absent class members. 56 If
3, 79 (1983) ("The creation of the class member's power-duty of exclusion, or right
to opt out, is a formal recognition of a person's interest in selecting counsel and
through this choice, in controlling one's own litigation.").
151. See Miller & Crump, supra note 117, at 52.
152. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,812 (1985).
153. 2 Newberg & Conte, supra note 25, § 11.53, at 11-127.
154. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940).
[S]o far as it can be said that the members of the class who are present are,
by generally recognized rules of law, entitled to stand in judgment for those
who are not, we may assume for present purposes that such procedure
affords a protection to the parties who are represented though absent, which
would satisfy the requirements of due process and full faith and credit.
Id. at 43.
155. See, e.g., Diane P. Wood, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 Ind.
L.J. 597, 600-01 (1987).
Whenever a self-designated class representative appears before a court,
there is a risk that the court will permit the action to proceed as a class
action even though significant differences remain between the
representative and the unnamed class members. There is also a danger that
the person with the greatest stake in the litigation will not be a class member
at all, but will be instead the class lawyer.
Id.
156. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 43-44 (finding lack of due process due to
inadequacy of representation); see also Howard M. Downs, Federal Class Actions:
Due Process by Adequacy of Representation (Identity of Claims) and the Impact of
General Telephone v. Falcon, 54 Ohio St. L.J. 607, 635 (1993) (noting that adequacy
of representation serves to provide due process protection for absent class members);
Elizabeth R. Kaczynski, The Inclusion of Future Members in Rule 23(b)(2) Class
Actions, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 397, 400 (1985) (adequacy of representation and other
Rule 23(a) requirements "are considered an adequate substitute for ... traditional
due process safeguards"); Nancy Morawetz, Underinclusive Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 402, 424 (1996) ("[Rule 23] reflects due-process concerns through its
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absent class members have not been adequately represented, they
have been denied due process and cannot be bound by the class
judgment. Although "the two factors that are now predominantly
recognized as the basic guidelines for the Rule 23(a)(4) prerequisite
are (1) absence of conflict and (2) assurance of vigorous
prosecution," '157 the "satisfaction of the typicality test is [also] an
integral element of adequate representation." '158
The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to
merge. Both serve as guideposts for determining whether under the
particular circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical
and whether the named plaintiff's claim and the class claims are so
interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and
adequately protected in their absence. Those requirements
therefore also tend to merge with the adequacy-of-representation
requirement, although the latter requirement also raises concerns
about the competency of class counsel and conflicts of interest.
1 59
Similar to the overlapping of the Rule 23(a) prerequisites of
typicality and adequate representation is the approach described by
one prominent commentator as "resembl[ing] the lack of conflict
approach."'
Courts have required "identity of interests," "coextensive interests,"
"coincidence of interests," "common interests,' ''compatible
interests" and "shared issues and interests.". .. To some extent,
however, terms such as identity, coextensiveness, and coincidence
may imply too strict a standard. Identity certainly goes too far, as
does coincidence, which is nearly synonymous with identity, and
coextensiveness which merely adds to the confusion with the Rule
23(a)(3) and (a)(4) prerequisites because it has sometimes been
used as a test for typicality. Shared interests, on the other hand, does
not go far enough, because it fails to account for a plaintiff who
shares some interests with the class (typicality) but nevertheless has
conflicts with class members. Moreover, a shared interest
automatically results from satisfaction of the Rule 23(a)(3) typicality
prerequisite. Adequate representation demands more. Lack of
conflict remains the most direct approach for determining whether a
plaintiff is an adequate representative for the class.16'
Looking initially at the "vigorous prosecution" component, which is
one of the basic guidelines in evaluating the adequacy of
requirement of adequacy of representation."); Alan B. Morrison, The Inadequate
Search for "Adequacy" in Class Actions: A Brief Reply to Professors Kahan and
Silberman, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1179, 1179 (1998) (adequacy of representation is an
essential element of due process).
157. 1 Newberg & Conte, supra note 25, § 3.22, at 3-126.
158. Id. at 3-128.
159. General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982).
160. 1 Newberg & Conte, supra note 25, § 3.23, at 3-131.
161. Id. at 3-131 to 3-132.
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representation,'6 2 the shortcomings become apparent. Two factors
that courts commonly consider are class counsel's experience and the
existence of conflicts of interest.163  Turning first to class counsel's
experience, this very factor would tend to preclude the appointment
of a Canadian attorney as one of the class counsel, because class
actions have existed in Canada for a relatively short period.',, The
experience factor is even more problematic if the foreign counsel
practices in a country with no class action device. Yet there is a very
real danger that if all class counsel are U.S. attorneys, class counsel
will not fight hard enough for non-U.S. interests.
This danger is not merely hypothetical. A $3 billion global class
action settlement initially announced in 1994 for damages suffered
from silicone breast implants allocated only three percent of the
settlement fund to non-U.S. citizens-who constituted fifty percent of
the class.165 After this initial settlement fell through, a subsequent
settlement was reached, which although better, still gave non-U.S.
claimants only half of that awarded to U.S. claimants. 66 Thus, the
162. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (describing adequacy of
representation).
163. See, e.g., Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d 426, 433 (2d Cir. 1983) (considering
experience and any "coercion or collusion"); see also Linda S. Mullenix, The
Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action Amendments, 39 Ariz. L. Rev.
615, 638 (1997) (noting that in class litigation, courts examine whether class counsel is
experienced and free of conflicts of interest). Proposed amendments to Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would add a new subsection (g), which would
require a court to consider, among other things, an attorney's experience in
appointing class counsel, as well as any other matter pertinent to counsel's ability to
"fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class." See
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2002/8-01CV.pdf, at 13 (last visited July 19,
2003).
164. Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50; see also David A. Klein, Class
Action Litigation: Handling Cases Where the Wrong Crosses National Boundaries, 1
ATLA Annual Convention Reference Materials 253, 265 (2001) (noting that one
method for "dealing with cross-border class action litigation is for Canadian plaintiffs'
counsel to collaborate with U.S. counsel").
165. See Klein, supra note 164, at 259.
Even when Canadians are successful in obtaining inclusion in a U.S. class
action, the results may be less than Canadian class members were hoping
for. In 1994, a $3 billion global class action settlement was announced for
silicone breast implant victims. Unfortunately, only 3 percent of the
settlement fund had been allocated for the 50 percent of class members who
resided outside the United States.
Id.; see also Mike McKee, Complaints Threaten Settlement: Foreigners Feel Cheated by
Breast-Implant Deal, Legal Times, Aug. 29, 1994, at 2 (noting that "the settlement
allocates foreign claimants only 3 percent"); Mike McKee, Judge Modifies Breast-
Implant Settlement, Legal Times, Sept. 12, 1994, at 14 (reporting that a proposed
settlement in the breast-implant case imposed a cap of 3 percent of the settlement
funds for damages caused to non-U.S. claimants); id. ("[The Alabama federal judge
approving a subsequent breast-implant settlement] said that while foreign women
might not receive as much compensation as Americans, they would be guaranteed no
less than 40 percent of the amount given U.S. claimants, but no more than 90
percent.").
166. See Klein, supra note 164, at 259.
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notion that adequacy of representation, with respect to class counsel,
is satisfied by experience alone is erroneous.
With respect to the second factor, that of conflicts of interest, many
would argue that conflicts of interest are inherent in class litigation.167
Typically, class members know little about, and have little control
over, the decision-making process whereby an attorney is selected as
class counsel. Moreover, once appointed, absent class members
cannot discharge class counsel. Indeed, even the class representatives
cannot unilaterally fire class counsel; only the court may discharge
class counsel.161
Similarly, the factors courts evaluate with respect to the adequacy
of the named class representative-typicality and conflicts of
interest-tend to fall short when the class is transnational. When
evaluating typicality, courts tend to focus on claim-based factors, such
as whether the claims are similar in fact, in legal theory, and in the
resulting harm. 169  Although an appropriate starting point, this
In the end, the settlement collapsed as a result of being overwhelmed with
claims for compensation and the largest defendant, Dow Corning
Corporation, went into Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. The remaining
defendants created a new settlement package that gave foreign claimants
about half of the amounts paid to U.S. residents.
Id.
The proposed Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, discussed in note 138, would
create a new section, 28 U.S.C. § 1713, prohibiting courts from approving a proposed
settlement "that provides for the payment of greater sums to some class members
than to others solely on the basis that the class members to whom the greater sums
are to be paid are located in closer geographic proximity to the court." H.R. 1115,
108th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 12, 2003). Although the provision appears drafted with
U.S. claimants in mind, the provision, if it becomes law, could be used in a manner
that might prevent the kind of unfairness to non-U.S. claimants that occurred in the
silicone breast implant settlement.
167. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1343, 1367-83 (1995) (identifying potential conflicts of
interest between class counsel and class members); Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A.
Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59
Brook. L. Rev. 961, 1048-50 (1993) (discussing conflicting interests in mass personal
injury litigation); Kahan & Silberman, supra note 40, at 775 ("[T]he danger of abuse
in class actions cannot be eliminated without eliminating class actions themselves.");
Mary Kay Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action
Lawyer, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 385, 395-96 (1987) (identifying conflicts between counsel and
class members); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v.
Amchem Products, Inc., 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1045, 1123-27 (1995) (discussing conflicts
and collusive settlements).
168. See, e.g., Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1077-79
(2d Cir. 1995) (decision to discharge class counsel rests with the court, not with the
class representatives); see also Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New
Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 Duke J.
Comp. & Int'l L. 179, 189 (2001) [hereinafter Hensler, Revisiting the Monster] (noting
that "[p]laintiffs have little control over their lawyer-agents").
169. See Alpern v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 84 F.3d 1525, 1540 (8th Cir. 1996).
[Typicality is] fairly easily met so long as other class members have claims
similar to the named plaintiff.... Factual variations in the individual claims
will not normally preclude class certification if the claim arises from the
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analysis does not encompass the full range of considerations necessary
when the wrong has crossed national boundaries. Indeed, the
existence of different legal regimes alone can destroy typicality. The
presence of class members who are merely from different states can
create typicality problems, much less class members from different
countries. 170 The perspective of the claimant is also important to a
typicality determination. Cultural mores, for example, differ among
nations generally,'7 ' and may specifically have an impact on a foreign
claimant's reaction to litigation. 172
As is evident from the initial global settlement involving silicone
breast implants,173 there is a danger that the voices and interests of
non-U.S. class members can be largely overlooked. In addition to the
natural tendency to look out for one's own interests, 74 there is a
potential for prejudices or biases against "foreigners,' 1 75 leading to the
same event or course of conduct as the class claims, and gives rise to the
same legal or remedial theory.
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also R. Chris Heck,
Comment, Conflict and Aggregation: Appointing Individual Investors as Sole Lead
Plaintiffs Under the PSLRA, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1199, 1208 (1999) ("Typicality
requires that the class representative have claims based on the same legal theories as
those of the class ....").
170. See, e.g., In re Paxil Litig., 212 F.R.D. 539, 542 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (finding
plaintiffs failed to show that differences in state laws within each subclass was
nonmaterial); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Elizabethtown v. Coca-Cola Co., 98 F.R.D.
254, 266 (D. Del. 1983) (finding no typicality where all claims involved the same legal
theory, but the claims implicated the contract laws of 30 different states); Layne S.
Kruse & Joy M. Soloway, Should a Court Certify Class of Foreign Residents Seeking
Damages in U.S.?, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 8, 1999, at S7 (approaching the issue from the
perspective of predominance rather than typicality, reporting that "[i]f nationwide
classes give rise to choice of law issues that defeat the predominance requirement,
then the effect of choice of law issues is most surely exacerbated in a multi-national
class").
171. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 142, at 191 ("For those who are lucky.., enough to
become involved in multinational litigation..., a number of non-legal issues will soon
arise, among them: (1) time and distance and (2) language and culture."); Fanto,
supra note 143, at 123-24 ("[A]n outsider may find cultural differences, characteristics
and pressures often difficult to understand and sometimes even to recognize as
differences."); Kuzuhara, supra note 143, at 89-90 (discussing differences between the
cultures of Japan and the United States).
172. See, e.g., Kuzuhara, supra note 143, at 58 ("[T]he typical American business
person says the Japanese approach to business negotiations wastes time. Conversely,
the Japanese complain about the American dry approach to business deals.");
Seymour J. Rubin, The Interest Group on Avoidance and Resolution of International
Economic Disputes, 83 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 152, 153 (1989) (noting that many
non-U.S. cultures, including European cultures, "prefer that disputes be settled
without recourse to litigation, by discussion seeking to reach agreement").
173. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text (discussing disparities in
proposed silicone breast implant settlement in awards to U.S. and non-U.S.
claimants).
174. See John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution,
114 Harv. L. Rev. 511, 585 (2000) ("We have reason to suspect that citizens are more
likely to protect their own interests than those of foreigners ....").
175. See Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and
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likelihood that non-U.S. claimants' interests will be discounted or
disregarded.176 This difference in perspective may both affect the
typicality determination and present the opportunity for a conflict of
interest. Class representatives must thus recognize, and compensate
for, this disparity in bargaining power in order to achieve adequacy of
representation.
In addition to concerns about the adequacy of representation, the
presence of foreign claimants in a class action lawsuit also raises
concerns with respect to opting out of the class litigation.
4. Opportunity to Opt Out
"[D]ue process requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be
provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by
executing and returning an 'opt out' or 'request for exclusion' form to
the court."'77 Providing an opportunity to opt out of class litigation is
meant to accord two mutually exclusive protections: (1) the ability to
withdraw from the class litigation and thereby retain individual
control, and (2) the ability to decline the opportunity for exclusion
and thereby impliedly consent to personal jurisdiction.' However,
both of these protections falter for absent class members in another
country.
Representative litigation is a relatively new development in
Canada,179 and does not exist at all in many other countries. 8  Thus,
as an initial matter, the wording of an opt out notice should be
Modern Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction Over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21
Yale J. Int'l L. 1, 35 (1996) ("Bias against noncitizens unfortunately remains to this
day."); Guadalupe T. Luna, LatCrit VI, America Latina and Jurisprudential
Associations, 54 Rutgers L. Rev. 803, 814 (2002) ("Border issues and xenophobia ...
are difficult to reconcile with declarations that the various nations are in parity with
the United States."); Anthony D. Romero, In Defense of Liberty at a Time of
National Emergency, 29 Hum. Rts. 16, 17 (2002) (noting the "popular fear of
foreigners").
176. See Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International
Tax Competition, 89 Geo. L.J. 543, 581 (2001) (noting foreigners' "status as
outsiders"); see also id. at 583 ("Whether conscious or not, xenophobia is a
widespread trait; aliens are generally regarded as sufficiently 'other' that their
interests are not accorded the same degree of respect as those of most nationals.
These disregarded interests include financial interests .... ); Ann Davis, Perceptions
Integral Part of Death Suits, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 12, 1992, at 8 (reporting that plaintiffs'
attorneys in one lawsuit complained, "'[t]he Defendant mistakenly believes the value
of [the decedent's] life must be discounted because he was not a natural born U.S.
citizen').
177. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
178. But see Miller & Crump, supra note 117, at 17 (noting that a court lacking
power over an individual should not have the power to attach adverse legal
consequences to that individual's failure to answer a communication from that court).
179. Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50; see Garry D. Watson, Class
Actions: The Canadian Experience, 11 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 269 (2001).
180. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing the unique nature of the
class action device).
2003]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
especially clear and straightforward when any absent class members
are citizens of another country due to the likely unfamiliarity of such
persons with the concept of class action litigation. Without careful
and clear language, the non-U.S. recipient is unlikely to understand its
significance, and therefore is more likely merely to discard it, thus
frustrating both purposes of the opt out notice. If the notice is not
understood, an absent class member will not be able to opt out from
the existing class litigation, thereby remaining in the class, although
not necessarily by choice, which foils the notion of implied consent to
the court's jurisdiction.'
It is with respect to the failure to opt out as constituting consent
that an even greater danger lies for non-U.S. absent class members.
Consent to personal jurisdiction is often a legal fiction under the best
of circumstances. The hapless defendant who answers a complaint
without challenging personal jurisdiction has consented to such
jurisdiction without knowing he has done so-a far cry from an
affirmative agreement.'82  When consent is predicated upon a
claimant's failure to respond to a lengthy legal notice generated by a
far-away foreign court in connection with a potentially unfamiliar type
of legal proceeding, the unfairness is apparent. 83
A nationwide class raises interstate comity concerns, but at least all
of the claimants are from the United States, and are bound by the
same federal Constitution and the same federal legal system. In
reaching across national boundaries and attempting to bind foreign
claimants, U.S. courts potentially take away legal rights from foreign
claimants. Under such circumstances-with claimants from another
country, who may speak another language, who may be unfamiliar
with the U.S. legal system, and who, depending on the country, may
181. The involuntary plaintiff doctrine permits the joinder of a party over whom
there is otherwise no personal jurisdiction, and binds that party under principles of
res judicata. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a) ("If the person should join as a plaintiff but
refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an
involuntary plaintiff."). The involuntary plaintiff doctrine does not apply to bind
absent plaintiff class members for two reasons. First, the doctrine is largely restricted
to patent claims. See June F. Entman, Compulsory Joinder of Compensating Insurers:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and the Role of Substantive Law, 45 Case W. Res.
L. Rev. 1, 27 n.108 (1994) (involuntary plaintiff doctrine has been applied in patent
claims brought by a licensee). Second, and more importantly, the involuntary
plaintiff doctrine is applied only where the party seeking to invoke the doctrine is
entitled to use the non-party's name to prosecute the action. See id. (noting "patent
claims brought by a licensee, in which the absentee (owner of the patent) has a duty
to join in the suit or to permit use of his name"); see also Indep. Wireless Tel. Co. v.
Radio Corp. of Am., 269 U.S. 459, 467 (1926) (noting that "[a]ny rights of the licensee
must be enforced through or in the name of the owner of the patent"). The class
action context presents no similar class entitlement to use the absentees' names in
order to pursue the class litigation.
182. See infra notes 226-32 and accompanying text (discussing inadvertent consent
to personal jurisdiction).
183. See Monaghan, supra note 139, at 1154 ("Indeed, as a factual matter, [class
action] notices are consciously designed to encourage nonappearance.").
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have had less formal schooling than most U.S. citizens'84-the notion
of failing to respond to a lengthy legal notice as constituting consent
falls.
Different issues arise when the class is one of defendants rather
than plaintiffs.
B. Defendant Classes
In authorizing both plaintiff and defendant classes, Rule 23 does
not create any differentiations between the two. 85 Defendant class
actions are relatively uncommon,'186 but pose unusual due process
concerns in that the plaintiffs select the representative for the
defendant class.187 This creates an opportunity for collusion as well as
a temptation to select a weak defendant as the representative. 88
One prominent commentator has asserted that due process
concerns arise in a more limited fashion in defendant class actions,
and moreover, personal jurisdiction issues tend to be of lesser
moment because individual issues typically remain, requiring
collateral proceedings.
[T]he determination of the amount of monetary relief against each
class member [usually] will raise some individual issues that cannot
be resolved on a common basis in a class proceeding. In addition,
the defendant must be afforded an opportunity to present unique
defenses. Thus, independent proceedings will be required to
establish the amount of monetary relief to which the plaintiff is
entitled to recover against any particular defendant class member.
A specific monetary judgment against individual defendant class
members is not available on a class action basis, except to the
limited extent of developing a common formula or guideline that
will serve as the measure of damages in proceedings against
individual class members. Personal jurisdiction over each member is
required before an effective personal judgment can be reached
against that member individually, so that collateral proceedings
potentially in a variety of forums will generally be required
184. See, e.g., Barbara Ferguson, Comment, The Legal and Political Challenges to
Academic Eligibility Requirements, 2 Marq. Sports L.J. 103, 105 (1991) (noting that
America traditionally has had a higher educational attainment than most other
countries).
185. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; see also Debra J. Gross, Comment, Mandatory Notice and
Defendant Class Actions: Resolving the Paradox of Identity Between Plaintiffs and
Defendants, 40 Emory L.J. 611, 615 (1991) ("It is clear that Rule 23 both
contemplates and permits defendant class actions. Unfortunately, the rule does not
differentiate between plaintiff and defendant classes in terms of application or
treatment .... ").
186. See Simpson & Perra, supra note 34, at 1319 (noting "the sparse law governing
defendant class action lawsuits"); Wood, supra note 155, at 608 ("Common question
class actions for damages against defendant classes are exceedingly rare, for obvious
reasons.").
187. See Note, Defendant Class Actions, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 640 (1978).
188. 1 Newberg & Conte, supra note 25, § 4.59, at 4-223 to 4-227.
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subsequent to a finding of liability against a class of defendants in
order for the plaintiff to realize any judgment for monetary relief
against any particular member of a defendant class. An aggregate
monetary judgment against a defendant class is theoretically
possible, but the plaintiff cannot execute on even that aggregate
judgment except in individual proceedings against each class
member in a forum that has personal jurisdiction over the particular
class member involved and where each class member will be given
an opportunity to raise any unique defenses it has to avoid liability
or damages in whole or in part. 189
Shutts expressly declined to address personal jurisdiction issues in
the context of defendant class actions.19° As noted previously,
defendant class actions are rare, and typically would involve a more
discrete number of class members.191 However, there is no reason to
believe that a court has the power to issue a binding judgment upon a
defendant-even if that defendant is part of a defendant class-where
that defendant has no nexus to the forum and her purported consent
to suit is based on her failure to opt out of the class. Accordingly,
there is no reason to treat members of a defendant class any
differently than a defendant in a non-class lawsuit-meaning that
minimum contacts with the forum state would be necessary in order to
bind the defendant class member to the judgment, and if minimum
contacts were not established, the class judgment would be
unenforceable with respect to that defendant."9 This conclusion is
consistent with the Supreme Court's approach to foreign litigants in
non-class litigation in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,1
93
discussed in the next section.
189. Id. § 4.48, at 4-193 to 4-194 (citations omitted); see also Faulk, supra note 131,
at 227.
[Although i]t is questionable whether American class action judgments are
actually enforceable against defendants' assets located outside of the United
States, the adoption of American-style class action rules by other nations...
may render such judgments enforceable, at least in part. If such rules are
adopted, foreign defendants may no longer be able to resist enforcement by
arguing that the American class action is fatally dissimilar and
fundamentally contrary to their homeland's judicial procedures and public
policies. Indeed, even without formal adoption of class action principles in
other nations, American class action awards may soon be rendered
enforceable by treaty. For example, enforcement might ultimately be
permitted by the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters-a critical agreement that has, to date, not
yet been approved.
Id.
190. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 n.3 (1985).
191. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (discussing the paucity of
defendant class actions).
192. See Wood, supra note 155, at 608 ("[The Supreme Court in Shutts] left the
strong impression that nothing less than a full 'minimum contacts' showing (or
unambiguous consent) plus notice would be required to support a valid exercise of
adjudicatory jurisdiction over defendant class members.").
193. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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III. A JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS FOR TRANSNATIONAL CLASS
ACTIONS
Having identified some of the concerns inherent in transnational
class actions, this section proposes a jurisdictional analysis for such
class litigation, as well as some practical considerations. This proposal
maintains the distinction created in Shutts between (b)(3) classes as
contrasted with (b)(1) or (b)(2) classes. Moreover, this proposal is
aimed primarily at trial judges overseeing class litigation, rather than
counsel, because the procedural validity of class action litigation
largely rests with the level of oversight provided by the trial court.'
A. Personal Jurisdiction in Transnational Class Actions
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts did not discuss potential cautions in
asserting personal jurisdiction over a non-U.S. entity, and apparently
this issue was not raised by the parties, despite the existence of foreign
claimants within the class.195 After noting the presence of class
members from "several foreign countries" in the opening
paragraph, 96 the Court never again mentioned the foreign claimants.
Instead, Shutts focused on the prerequisites for personal jurisdiction
over absent plaintiff class members without distinguishing among or
between U.S. states and foreign nations, or between U.S. claimants
and non-U.S. claimants. Claimants from Oklahoma and claimants
from Canada were treated in exactly the same manner. Although the
Supreme Court's failure to discuss this issue could be construed as
meaning that no due process distinctions exist between U.S. and non-
U.S. claimants, the Court's narrow and potentially misleading view of
class actions demands further examination. Whatever the
rationalization for viewing the failure to opt out as constructive
consent, and whatever the benefits to a maximum aggregation of
claims and parties, the justifications for substituted consent in a U.S.
class action do not hold in class actions involving non-U.S. citizens.
The United States Supreme Court has noted that a party's status as
a non-U.S. entity is a factor in determining whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction is reasonable, although, in general, "the same
limitations on personal jurisdiction.., apply to foreigners as are
applied to U.S. citizens."' 97 Eight Justices in Asahi Metal Industry Co.
194. See Kahan & Silberman, supra note 40, at 781-82 ("[T]he principal burden to
monitor class counsel falls on the court considering the settlement. The judge.., who
approves a settlement and makes a finding of adequate representation (as well as
substantive fairness), will be in a position -in fact, is required- to find out whether
class counsel up to this point adequately represented the class members.").
195. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 799.
196. Id. at 799.
197. Gary B. Born & David Westin, International Civil Litigation in United States
Courts 92 (2d ed. 1992); see also Brilmayer, American Federal System, supra note 29,
at 290 (noting that under Helicopteros, "nonresident alien defendants receive the
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v. Superior Court19 8 agreed that "[t]he unique burdens placed upon
one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have
significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the
long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders."199 Although
the Court left the impact of the participation of a non-U.S. entity in a
lawsuit to a case by case determination, the Court left no doubt that
crossing national borders introduces the necessity for additional
caution in the assertion of personal jurisdiction:
[A] court [must] consider the procedural and substantive policies of
other nations whose interests are affected by the assertion of
jurisdiction by the [forum state]. The procedural and substantive
interests of other nations in a state court's assertion of jurisdiction
over an alien defendant will differ from case to case. In every case,
however, those interests, as well as the Federal Government's
interest in its foreign relations policies, will be best served by a
careful inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of
jurisdiction in the particular case, and an unwillingness to find the
serious burdens on an alien defendant outweighed by minimal
interests on the part of the plaintiff or the forum State. "Great care
and reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of
personal jurisdiction into the international field. 200
Thus, in evaluating minimum contacts sufficient for personal
jurisdiction in a context involving non-U.S. entities, none of the
Justices in Asahi was willing to assert personal jurisdiction over the
non-U.S. defendant, although for different reasons.20 ' Of course, such
a reluctance to find jurisdiction would not exist in all cases involving a
foreign defendant -Asahi presented the unusual situation of a cross-
complaint for indemnification remaining after the U.S. plaintiff had
settled and dismissed all of his original claims against all of the
original defendants, where the parties to the cross-complaint were
both non-U.S. corporations.2 2
same protection from the long arm of a state court as residents of other states do").
198. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
199. Id. at 114.
200. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115 (quoting United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379
U.S. 378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
201. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 (four Justices conclude that the non-U.S. defendant
did not have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state); id. (four Justices
conclude that although the non-U.S. defendant had minimum contacts with the forum
state, exercising personal jurisdiction would not comport with fair play and
substantial justice); id. at 121-22 (three Justices state that because exercising personal
jurisdiction over the non-U.S. defendant in this case would be "unreasonable and
unfair," it was unnecessary to examine the defendant's contacts with the forum state).
202. Id. at 106; see also Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694 (1982) (upholding assertion of personal jurisdiction over fourteen
foreign defendants); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)
(applying International Shoe's minimum contacts test to a Philippines corporation and
concluding that asserting personal jurisdiction over the corporation would not violate
due process).
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The Supreme Court has amply illustrated that in non-class
litigation, traditional notions of personal jurisdiction, as manifested
through minimum contacts with the forum state, govern cases
involving foreign, as well as domestic, litigants.2 °3 In light of the
additional concerns articulated in Asahi regarding reasonableness
when personal jurisdiction is asserted over a foreign defendant,
similar concerns should hold in class actions involving foreign
claimants, whether plaintiffs or defendants.2°4
If a foreign claimant has minimum contacts with the forum state,
and if the court concludes that exercising personal jurisdiction over
the foreign claimant is reasonable, the court would have the power in
a traditional non-class lawsuit to enter a binding judgment with
respect to that claimant (assuming, of course, that the claimant was
provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard). Some
commentators have suggested that, in the class action context, if
traditional minimum contacts exist, the court need not provide an
opportunity to opt out because personal jurisdiction thereby exists,
and consent is thus unnecessary.2 5 This Article disagrees with such an
approach, at least when the class action includes class members from
other nations.
If the class action includes foreign claimants, additional due process
protections may be necessary as a means of ensuring that the assertion
203. See, e.g., Perkins, 342 U.S. at 444-45.
[1]f an authorized representative of a foreign corporation be physically
present in the state of the forum and be there engaged in activities
appropriate to accepting service or receiving notice on its behalf, we
recognize that there is no unfairness in subjecting that corporation to the
jurisdiction of the courts of that state through such service of process upon
that representative. This has been squarely held to be so in a proceeding in
personam against such a corporation, at least in relation to a cause of action
arising out of the corporation's activities within the state of the forum....
The essence of the issue here, at the constitutional level, is a like one of
general fairness to the corporation. Appropriate tests for that are discussed
in International Shoe .... The amount and kind of activities which must be
carried on by the foreign corporation in the state of the forum so as to make
it reasonable and just to subject the corporation to the jurisdiction of that
state are to be determined in each case.
Id.
For an argument that international law should apply to assertions of personal
jurisdiction over a foreign litigant, see Strauss, supra note 7, at 373; see also Born,
Reflections, supra note 7, at 1 (arguing for a modification of due process limitations
on personal jurisdiction in cases involving foreign defendants).
204. See Wood, supra note 155, at 605.
There should be nothing shocking about suggesting that the way in which
the due process rights of the absentees will be protected will vary from case
to case, and from class type to class type. The court's judicial jurisdiction
will also vary, depending on the relationship between the adjudicating state
and the class that the representative is proposing to bring before the court.
Id.
205. See, e.g., Miller & Crump, supra note 117, at 31-32.
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of personal jurisdiction is reasonable.2"6 In traditional non-class
litigation, a foreign defendant's minimum contacts would be
supplemented by service of the summons and complaint in accordance
with Rule 4(f). 207 Notice pursuant to Rule 4 is different from notice
pursuant to Rule 23(c)(2): a class action notice is not the legal
equivalent of a summons.2 8 Not only do a summons and complaint
206. Differences in the treatment of jurisdiction when a foreign litigant is involved,
as contrasted with solely domestic litigants, is authorized not only by Asahi, but also
by constitutional and common law doctrine in other areas. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co.
v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 (1981) ("a foreign plaintiff's choice [of forum] deserves
less deference [in forum non conveniens analysis]"); Barcelona Traction, Light &
Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain) 1970 I.C.J. 3, 164 (1970) (Jessup, J.) (noting that rules that
are "valid enough for interstate conflicts within the constitutional system of the
United States may be improper when placing a burden on international commerce").
207. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f) provides:
Unless otherwise provided by federal law, service upon an individual from
whom a waiver has not been obtained and filed, other than an infant or an
incompetent person, may be effected in a place not within any judicial
district of the United States:
(1) by any internationally agreed means reasonably calculated to give notice,
such as those means authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents; or
(2) if there is no internationally agreed means of service or the applicable
international agreement allows other means of service, provided that service
is reasonably calculated to give notice:
(A) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in
that country in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; or
(B) as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory or
letter of request; or
(C) unless prohibited by the law of the foreign country, by
(i) delivery to the individual personally of a copy of the summons and the
complaint; or
(ii) any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and
dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to be served; or
(3) by other means not prohibited by international agreement as may be
directed by the court.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f); see also The Hague Convention, Multilateral Service Abroad of
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, Nov. 15, 1965, art. 1, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S.
No. 6638 (prescribing, "in civil or commercial matters," methods for service of "a
judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad"); id. at art. 5 (noting that
acceptable methods of service include a "method prescribed by [the Central
Authority of the State's] internal law for the service of documents in domestic actions
upon persons who are within its territory," or a "particular method requested by the
applicant, unless such a method is incompatible with the law of the State addressed,"
and that "the document may always be served by delivery to an addressee who
accepts it voluntarily").
208. Monaghan, supra note 139, at 1154 n.23 ("A class action notice is not
equivalent to a summons under Rule 4... or its state law counterparts."); see Martin
v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 763 (1989) ("Unless duly summoned to appear in a legal
proceeding, a person not a privy may rest assured that a judgment recovered therein
will not affect his legal rights." (internal citation omitted)); see also Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808, 810 (1985) (whereas a "defendant summoned by a
plaintiff is faced with the full powers of the forum State to render judgment against
it," an absent plaintiff class member, "[u]nlike a defendant in a normal civil suit.., is
not required to do anything." (emphasis omitted)).
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command more attention from the recipient because they are official
in appearance and contain the imprimatur of the court,29 but Rule 4
notice will sometimes require personal service rather than mailing. 1°
Moreover, in traditional non-class litigation, "[d]ue process requires
that the defendant be given adequate notice of the suit... and be
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court. '211  Thus, it is
improper to assume that minimum contacts alone, without the other
concomitant protections accompanying those contacts in non-class
litigation, are a sufficient basis for issuing a binding judgment against
a foreign claimant in class litigation.
In addition, among the practical reasons commanding a closer
evaluation of the assertion of personal jurisdiction over foreign
claimants is the potential impact on foreign relations. Carelessness
and overreaching in asserting jurisdiction over foreign citizens may
cause offense or resentment in foreign countries.212
209. See Monaghan, supra note 139, at 1154 n.24 (noting that "the distinction
between formal process and notice reflects an important reality.").
210. See generally Wood, supra note 155, at 620-21.
The standards for service under Rule 4 and its state counterparts are
significantly different from the notices required by the class action rules.
Although service by first-class mail is an option under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), if
no acknowledgement of service is returned, personal service or service at the
individual's dwelling house (for an individual) is then required. This initial
safeguard of the absentee's interest is precisely what justifies a finding of
waiver with respect to personal jurisdiction objections (the equivalent of
jurisdiction by consent) when the defendant appears and is silent, and it is
lacking in Rule 23(c)(2).
Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2)(C)(i) (providing for personal service for foreign
citizens under some circumstances).
211. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) (emphasis
added).
212. See generally Born, Reflections, supra note 7, at 28-29.
[A]ssertions of United States judicial jurisdiction over foreigners can readily
arouse foreign resentment. This risk is heightened because, although United
States principles of judicial jurisdiction are generally consistent with
international law, they are not always so .... Because exorbitant assertions
of judicial jurisdiction by United States courts may offend foreign
sovereigns, these claims can provoke diplomatic protests, trigger commercial
or judicial retaliation, and threaten friendly relations in unrelated fields. ...
Most significantly, these claims can interfere with United States efforts to
conclude international agreements providing for mutual recognition and
enforcement of judgments or restricting exorbitant jurisdictional claims by
foreign states.
Id.; see also Raymond Paretzky, A New Approach to Jurisdictional Questions in
Transnational Litigation in U.S. Courts, 10 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. 663, 682 (1988).
Foreign states justifiably resent overly expansive U.S. assertions of personal
jurisdiction and unduly jingoistic U.S. choice of law determinations. In the
area of jurisdiction, the aggressive practices of U.S. courts have had tangible
negative effects on foreign policy. In the 1970s, the United States and the
United Kingdom negotiated on a proposed bilateral convention liberalizing
the laws of enforcement of judgments between the two countries. However,
the United Kingdom withdrew from the negotiations after British industry
claimed that the Convention would require recognition by British courts of
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Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts reflected a one-sided, distorted, and
misleading view of class actions. This view helped to justify the
Court's result in Shutts, but the Court's perspective obscures the
potential dangers for foreign claimants. In Shutts, the Court assumed
that class litigation will always benefit absent class members, without
recognizing the potential harms. For example, the Court stated that:
"An out-of-state defendant summoned by a plaintiff is faced with the
full powers of the forum State to render judgment against it. '213 In
practice, of course, the plaintiff class will not always prevail-and a
subsequent judgment for the defendant will extinguish the claims of
the participating class members, without regard to whether class
members' claims are large or small. The loss of valid monetary claims
due to a judgment against the class surely harms class members, just
as a class action judgment creating an obligation to pay harms
defendants. In either example, the parties lose money to which they
otherwise are entitled.
The Shutts Court further observed that plaintiff class members are
"not haled anywhere to defend themselves upon pain of a default
judgment. 2 14  Indeed, however, in this respect the potential
ramifications are much worse for some plaintiff class members than
for defendants. Because Shutts did not address the due process
concerns arising in the peculiar context of transnational class actions,
the Court ignored the possibility that an absent class member from
another country suffers the equivalent of a default judgment if she
receives inadequate notice regarding the class proceedings and the
class does not prevail at trial.
The Court assumed that absent class members needed fewer due
process protections than defendants because "[t]he court and named
plaintiffs protect [absent class members'] interests.... [An absent
class action plaintiff] may sit back and allow the litigation to run its
course, content in knowing that there are safeguards provided for his
protection. '215 As an initial matter, "sit[ting] back and allow[ing] the
litigation to run its course" assumes that the class member wishes to
participate in the class litigation as a plaintiff. If this assumption is
exorbitant jurisdictional claims by U.S. courts. Thus, a treaty beneficial to
the nation was lost because of the federal failure to check the jurisdictional
excesses of some U.S. courts.
Id.
Professor Brilmayer has also noted the political difficulties when a dispute
implicates other countries. Brilmayer, American Federal System, supra note 29, at
289 ("The resolution of [conflicts with an international component] is a particularly
delicate matter because the confrontation between laws and policies of the United
States and foreign states are often sharper and more complex than any analogous
showdown between two states. Simply put, overly aggressive adjudication can disrupt
commerce and peace between nations much more than it can between states.").
213. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808 (1985).
214. Id. at 809.
215. Id. at 809-10.
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incorrect-if the class member does not wish to participate in the class
litigation-she may not sit back, but instead must affirmatively opt
out or she will be bound by a result she neither sought nor desired.216
"Once enmeshed in a class action, class members cannot shape their
own claims, and their individual rights to participate in the class
proceeding are quite limited. '217  Moreover, subsequent cases have
illustrated the frequent inadequacy of class representatives and class
counsel to protect the interests of absent class members who are U.S.
citizens, much less to protect the interests of absent class members
from foreign countries.218
Class actions adjudicate the claims of all class members in a single
proceeding; a binding adjudication extinguishes all class members'
claims. Some class members will have claims of little value, which do
not merit individual litigation. But it cannot be assumed that all
claims are of little value. Moreover, whatever a claim's value, it
remains a property right.219
To foreclose the interests and claims of an indeterminate number of
persons is operationally no different than to do so vis-A-vis one or
more specified persons .... That an... absentee's claims are
foreclosed.., does not alter the fact that the absentee, whoever and
wherever he may be, is having his rights to the property adjudicated.
That being so, the exercise of jurisdiction in such a proceeding is not
without legal consequence to persons elsewhere ....22o
The binding effect of the class judgment affects class members
regardless of whether they win or lose. In either event, the class
judgment terminates their rights. In essence, class actions involving
foreign claimants often extinguish a non-U.S. citizen's property rights
in order to facilitate judicial expediency, which is an unjustifiable
practice.
216. See Kennedy, Bride of Frankenstein, supra note 117, at 270; Monaghan, supra
note 139, at 1170 ("Shutts announced a rule of forfeiture (i.e., 'you are precluded if
you do not take affirmative step X.')").
217. Monaghan, supra note 139, at 1149 n.1.
218. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (class
decertified where proposed class had exposure to different asbestos products, for
varying amounts of time, and over different periods, and where proposed settlement
fixed the range of damages available for future claimants with no adjustments for
inflation, in situation where named representatives were currently injured and thus
had interests conflicting with those exposed to asbestos but currently asymptomatic);
see also Faulk, supra note 131, at 206 ("Settlements achieved in mass tort cases are
fraught with potential conflicts of interest between individual plaintiffs and their
counsel. Moreover, the potential for collusive settlements, settlements that end the
controversy, compensate plaintiffs' counsel highly, and under-compensate individual
plaintiffs cannot be disregarded."); Koniak, supra note 167, at 1048-56 (discussing
alleged collusion between class counsel and defendants in reaching settlement
agreement).
219. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 807.
220. Hazard, supra note 79, at 267 (discussing in rem and in personam jurisdiction).
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1. The Exclusion Solution?
One potential approach to the due process concerns implicated by
the presence of foreign claimants within the class is to exclude non-
U.S. claimants from the class definition. This approach is simple and
easy to implement. By defining the class as all those U.S. residents
suffering a particular harm, the due process problems for foreign
claimants will not, and indeed cannot, arise.
Despite its ease of application, however, routinely excluding all
foreign claimants from class actions is not the best solution. There
will be circumstances where the inclusion of citizens from other
countries is desirable from all perspectives-desirable for the
defendant because it provides the opportunity to resolve additional
potential claims,22' desirable for the court for reasons of judicial
economy,222 and desirable for the foreign claimants, particularly if
they would not otherwise be able to obtain redress. 223 Accordingly,
although exclusion of foreign claimants from the class definition could
be a potential solution in some instances, it will not always be a
desirable solution.
2. The Foreign Claimant Subclass
Another potential approach to foreign claimants and due process
concerns is the use of a separate subclass for foreign claimants.224
221. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 167, at 1050 ("For defendants, aggregating
cases and arriving at a global resolution of mass litigation offers a means of capping
their exposure. ... [G]lobal settlements are attractive even when the price is high,
because they offer the opportunity to reduce uncertainty and limit transaction
costs.").
222. See Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, A Glass Half Empty: The Use of
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 Tex. L. Rev.
1587, 1606 (1995) ("Over time, courts, and some attorneys, appear to have developed
a preference for collective mechanisms, such as consolidation and aggregate
settlements, over streamlining individual case disposition, and for global settlements
resolving all current and future cases."). But see Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
Harv. L. Rev. 374, 445 (1982) ("Seduced by controlled calendars, disposition statistics,
and other trappings of the efficiency era and the high-tech age, managerial judges are
changing the nature of their work.... I want judges to balance the scales, not
abandon them altogether in the press to dispose of cases quickly.").
223. See Hensler, Revisiting the Monster, supra note 168, at 182.
[A] typical damage class action might arise when representative plaintiffs
allege that a defendant acting illegally has imposed small losses on a large
number of people or entities. No single individual would find it worthwhile
to pursue a lawsuit independently,... [b]ut collectively, class members
can-if the suit is successful -force the defendant to disgorge its ill-gotten
gains.
Id.
224. Rule 23 authorizes subclasses "[w]hen appropriate." See Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(4) ("When appropriate ... a class may be divided into subclasses and each
subclass treated as a class ..."); see also Note, Developments in the Law: Class
Actions, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1479 (1976) ("Subclassing provides the trial judge
with a means of increasing the reliability of party representation of absentee interests
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Again, this approach is relatively straightforward and easy to
implement. However, subclasses increase class litigation complexity
and may invoke potential manageability issues.225 Moreover, creating
a foreign claimant subclass may not work well when the foreign
claimants share a non-U.S. nationality, but do not share common legal
issues, common injuries, or similar damages. In addition, when
foreign claimants are from several other nations, the potential
necessity for numerous foreign claimant subclasses arises. Thus,
subclassing is an option, but again will not always be the best solution
for a particular case.
3. Consent
Personal jurisdiction over the parties is a prerequisite to a binding
judgment. Consent is an effective conferral of personal jurisdiction,226
but consent, as applied to a non-citizen, is more accurately described
as a waiver-a waiver of any challenges to the court's power to render
a valid judgment affecting the non-citizen's property rights. Waiver,
as the intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right,
requires that the non-citizen both know of the class action and of her
right to opt out, and that the non-citizen intentionally give up her
right to opt out of the class litigation.
Shutts' reasoning with respect to consent is based on potentially
invalid assumptions.
The Shutts Court's consent reasoning... is based on a vision of a
plaintiff with a small claim that would not be adjudicated but for the
inference of consent through silence. Its holding, however, also may
affect the rights of a large claimant. A class member with a large
claim may fail to opt out, and thus may evidence consent, because
she has misplaced a class notice or failed to receive it. If the class
member then fails to file a claim at the damage or settlement stage
because of lack of actual notice, her nonresponsiveness not only
signals consent but forecloses her from sharing in the award.2
The notion of failing to opt out as constituting consent28 is largely
by, in effect, adding additional parties to the lawsuit who more accurately reflect in
their own interests the interests of discrete groups of absentees.").
225. Subclasses have the capacity both to increase the manageability of the class
action, and to create manageability concerns. Compare Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
161 F.3d 127, 135 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that "the class will be splintered into various
subclasses-creating manageability concerns") with Dore v. Kleppe, 522 F.2d 1369,
1375 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting that subclasses can enhance the manageability of the class
action).
226. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
703 (1982) ("Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all
an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived.").
227. Miller & Crump, supra note 117, at 18 (citations omitted).
228. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 813 (1985) (a class member
is "presumed to consent" if she fails to opt out of the class litigation).
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fictitious. 2 9 A class member's failure to opt out of class litigation can
be the result of not receiving the class notice, receiving but not
understanding the class notice, setting the notice aside and losing it,
completing but then forgetting to mail the opt out form, and variants
on these themes. Accordingly, the failure to opt out can be the result
of any number of things. The failure to opt out may result from
laziness, procrastination, or actual consent-or from confusion and
lack of comprehension. 230 Thus, in the transnational context, where
confusion and unfamiliarity are much more likely to exist, it is
inappropriate to assume that silence constitutes assent in class
actions.23' Moreover, silence is not always construed as agreement in
other cultures:
A good example of the problems that can arise.., occurred during a
period of tension between Egypt and Greece a number of years ago.
Egyptian pilots radioed their intention to land their plane at a
Cypriot airbase, and the Greek air traffic controllers responded with
silence. While the Greeks intended their silence to indicate refusal
of the permission to land, the Egyptians interpreted the silence as
assent. When the plane landed, the Greeks fired on the plane,
resulting in the loss of several lives. 232
As the Supreme Court has noted, "great caution should be used not
to let fiction deny the fair play that can be secured only by a pretty
229. See Wood, supra note 155, at 609-10 (discussing defendant class actions).
An inference of consent to be sued from a failure to return an opt-out form
is so far from the knowing, voluntary type of consent that the Court usually
requires to support adjudicatory jurisdiction, and so contrary to normal
assumptions about human nature in lawsuits, that an argument to the
contrary is close to absurd.
Id.; see also id. at 620 ("The Shutts consent finesse, whereby consent can be inferred
from a failure to opt out, does violence to the general theory of consent.");
Monaghan, supra note 139, at 1170 n.95 ("Even ordinary contract law does not
ascribe a binding effect to an offeree's failure to respond to an offer. More
importantly, in dealing with constitutional guarantees, consent or waiver... is not
usually ascribed to inaction. This should be especially clear where the 'consent'-
inducing notices are written obscurely and are designed by counsel to encourage
inaction." (emphasis omitted)).
230. Miller & Crump, supra note 117, at 17; Monaghan, supra note 139, at 1185-86;
Wood, supra note 155, at 620. See generally Stefan H. Krieger, A Time to Keep Silent
and a Time to Speak: The Functions of Silence in the Lawyering Process, 80 Or. L.
Rev. 199, 202 (2001) ("By its very nature, silence is ambiguous and therefore
messy.").
231. See Krieger, supra note 230, at 233-34 (noting that "cultural context can...
have a significant bearing on... silence's meaning," and that "a number of studies
have been conducted on the meaning of silence in different cultures"); see also id. at
244 (noting that treating silence as agreement is a "popular notion in American
society, and especially the talkative legal culture"). This same American notion of
silence as agreement is also seen in evidence law. See id. at 247 (discussing adoptive
admissions). However, other cultures do not always assume that silence indicates
assent. See infra note 232 and accompanying text (discussing incident between Egypt
and Greece involving different interpretations of silence).
232. Krieger, supra note 230, at 233-34.
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close adhesion to fact. 23 3 Accordingly, for class actions involving
foreign claimants, such foreign claimants should be provided with the
opportunity to affirmatively opt into the class litigation in order to be
bound by the resulting judgment. In Shutts, the Supreme Court
rejected the suggestion that due process required an affirmative
opting-in procedure for all Rule 23(b)(3) class actions.234 However,
potential language barriers, unfamiliar legal procedures, and potential
intimidation in dealing with the courts and lawyers of another country
all tend to increase the risks of fear, confusion, and misunderstandings
by foreign claimants. Requiring foreign claimants to affirmatively opt
in, rather than absurdly construing their silence as an agreement to be
bound by the class litigation,235 will ensure that their consent is
genuine.
The opting in procedure is not unknown to the class action
process.236  Prior to 1966, in non-mandatory class actions, class
members could only participate in the class litigation if they
affirmatively opted into the lawsuit.2 37  The 1966 amendments, in
creating a duty to opt out, helped to facilitate the ultimate purposes of
class litigation by reducing the potential for individual lawsuits due to
the creation of consent as the default position. The articulated
purpose of changing the "opt-in" provision to an "opt-out" provision
"was to negate the unfairness of possible 'one-way intervention.' This
procedure allows a potential class member, who does not join before
trial and therefore is not bound by an adverse judgment, to intervene
after a favorable judgment to invoke its benefit. '238 This expressed
233. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
234. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
235. See Wood, supra note 155, at 620 (noting that "silence is a notoriously weak
expression of consent").
A putative customer's failure to object, after all, is not even sufficient to
support a mail order merchandiser's claim to be paid for unordered goods.
Although the [Supreme] Court [in Shutts] technically did not reach the
counterclaim issue, it seems clear that it would not treat the absentees'
failure to opt out as "real" consent, if the tables were turned and the
defendant tried to file a counterclaim against the plaintiff class. In short,
under normal standards for showing consent, the failure to opt out cannot
pass muster. The Court's only expressed justifications for allowing it to do
so here-that many states have been allowing opt-out multistate class
actions, and that this form of litigation seems desirable-do not seem strong
enough to override a right as fundamental as the right not to be deprived of
property by a forum lacking jurisdiction.
Id.
236. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1992); Pa. R. Civ. P.
1711(b) (optional opt-in classes for large claim groups or other special circumstances).
237. See Kennedy, Bride of Frankenstein, supra note 117, at 256 ("[P]ermissive
class members prior to 1966 had the duty affirmatively to 'opt in."').
238. Id.; see also Note, Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions, supra note 93, at 735-37
(discussing the practice of "one-way intervention" and lack of mutuality).
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concern, however, was subsequently reduced in light of modifications
to the law of collateral estoppel. 39
The potential risks of requiring foreign claimants to opt into the
class lawsuit include the possibility that many will not elect to do so,
and thus the class litigation will bind few foreign claimants. However,
it is not intrinsically unfair to expect a defendant to defend in more
than one country if the harm allegedly caused by the defendant
crosses national borders. Moreover, if the other country affected does
not offer a class action procedure,24 ° foreign class members with
modest claims may be more motivated to opt into the class litigation,
while foreign claimants who do not opt into the U.S. class litigation
may have larger claims that would warrant individual litigation.
Although there remains the risk that some foreign claimants will not
understand the notice, and that some will fail to opt in due to
confusion or procrastination, the opt-in procedure is a superior device
from a due process perspective.
In Shutts, the Supreme Court emphasized its previous assertion that
due process protects personal liberty interests. 41 In the context of a
239. See Kennedy, Bride of Frankenstein, supra note 117, at 257.
[T]he Supreme Court made two major movements in directions that were
somewhat inconsistent with the announced and the unannounced goals of
the opt-out device. In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, the Supreme Court
eliminated the strict common-law requirement of mutuality from the
doctrine of collateral estoppel. Because the [1966 Rules] Committee's
announced premise for the opt-out device had been the unfair lack of
mutuality contained in one-way intervention, the subsequent decision in
Parklane partially undercut the originally announced premise for creating
the opt-out device.
Id.
240. The availability, or non-availability, of a class action device in the foreign
claimant's home country has no impact on the due process analysis. A court may not
justify lesser due process protections for a foreign claimant based on the fact that the
claimant is a citizen of a country that does not have a class action procedure. The
reason is, hopefully, obvious. Class litigation binding a foreign claimant thereby
extinguishes her claim. Without proper due process protections, the foreign claimant
has lost individual control over her claim, regardless of whether the class wins or
loses. Even if the foreign claimant's home country does not authorize class actions,
the bound foreign claimant has thereby lost the ability to bring an individual lawsuit,
and, without appropriate due process safeguards, has lost the potential of actively
participating in (including potentially objecting to) various aspects of the class
proceedings. Even if the foreign claimant could not recover on her claim in her home
country due to the lack of any legal remedy for that type of claim, this cannot justify
depriving the claimant of the potential for shaping relief in the U.S. class action-such
as by objecting to a proposed settlement-by failing to provide adequate due process
protections in the class litigation.
241. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985); see Ins. Corp. of
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10 (1982) ("The
restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen ... must be
seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due
Process Clause."); see also Miller & Crump, supra note 117, at 54 ("[Tlhe right to opt
out not only is a check against distant forum abuse, but it also protects the claimant's
right to control her litigation.").
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transnational class action, the default result in the opt-out procedure
is to include the foreign class members in the existing class litigation,
thereby extinguishing their ability to take any other course of action,
including individual litigation. The default result in the opt-in
procedure, by contrast, is to exclude the foreign class members from
the existing class litigation, thereby leaving the foreign class members
with three potential options: (1) instituting a class action in their
home country (if a class action device exists); (2) instituting individual
lawsuits if claims are sufficiently large to warrant the expense of
individual actions; or (3) declining to seek legal relief. There can be
no question that the opt-in procedure affords more individual control.
When an opt-in procedure is provided, consent is no longer implied
or fictitious. In order to bind foreign claimants in a class action, those
claimants must affirmatively elect to join the existing class litigation,
which eliminates the possibility of fictitious consent. This provides
superior due process protections, and avoids the loss of individual
rights under circumstances where neither minimum contacts nor
genuine consent exist.
B. Practical Considerations for Transnational Class Actions
In addition to concerns specific to personal jurisdiction,
transnational class actions implicate other practical considerations
relevant to due process, including concerns related to adequate
representation, notice, and court oversight.
1. For All Class Actions: Adequate Representation
In order to satisfy the Rule 23(a) prerequisite of adequate
representation for a multi-national class, a non-U.S. class
representative should be a presumptive requirement. This non-U.S.
class representative may be either a named representative or a class
counsel. If the factual circumstances indicate disparities in interests
among various non-U.S. class members, it may become necessary to
have more than one non-U.S. representative in order to provide
adequate representation.
The court also should review the class carefully to determine
whether adequate representation impacts other areas. For example,
sufficient differences in U.S. versus non-U.S. class members' factual
circumstances, legal theories, or desired relief may introduce a
commonality issue requiring the establishment of a subclass for
foreign claimants.
2. For All Class Actions: Focused Court Review
In addition to the due process protections provided through
adequacy of representation, trial courts overseeing class litigation
involving transnational class members should undertake review of
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each stage of the class proceedings with the multi-national flavor of
the action firmly in mind. The trial court is the ultimate protector of
the rights of the class. A court might ensure that a foreign claimant is
appointed as one of the class representatives, but then that foreign
class representative may be too timid or too self-interested to follow
through in protecting the interests of other foreign class members.
Similarly, a court might ensure that a non-U.S. attorney is appointed
as one of the class counsel, but then that non-U.S. attorney may be
too timid or too self-interested to follow through in protecting the
interests of the foreign class members. Accordingly, the trial judge
should watch the proceedings with his or her usual care, and should
keep in mind the special circumstances that may be encountered when
foreign claimants have a stake in the proceedings, especially at the
settlement stage.
3. For Mandatory Notice Class Actions: Cover Letters
The confusing nature of a class action notice 242 requires additional
care when the recipient resides in a foreign country. To facilitate the
recipient's comprehension, notice under such circumstances should
include a cover letter, in the language of the recipient's home country,
addressed to the specific individual recipient, explaining the purpose
of the notice in a straightforward manner without legal jargon.
Although the cover letter would necessarily need to tell the recipient
to read the actual legal notice in full, the cover letter would provide
an introduction to the notice and would help the recipient to
understand its significance.
These additional practical steps, together with an opt-in procedure,
will help to ensure that the assertion of personal jurisdiction over
foreign claimants by United States courts provides full due process
protections.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has noted that "there has been a
failure of due process.., in those cases where it cannot be said that
the procedure adopted, fairly insures the protection of the interests of
absent parties who are to be bound by it. 2 43 In Shutts, the Court
provided guidelines for addressing due process and personal
jurisdiction issues in the class action context. Unaddressed, however,
242. See Monaghan, supra note 139, at 1185 ("[Class action notices] are designed to
encourage inaction; and they are frequently 'incomprehensible to average citizens."'
(citation omitted)); Wood, supra note 155, at 606-07 ("When a purported notice does
not adequately inform the recipient of what is at stake, or when it does not reach the
recipient sufficiently in advance of the hearing, it cannot serve its intended function of
making the opportunity to be heard count."); see also supra notes 138-41 and
accompanying text (describing intimidating nature of class action notices).
243. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940).
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were the considerations that a trial judge must take into account when
the putative class includes citizens from another country. This Article
proposes that the presence of non-U.S. claimants in class litigation
requires careful attention to due process protections if the class
judgment is to have a binding effect on those foreign claimants. These
precautions include the appointment of a foreign claimant as a class
representative or as a class counsel; attention by the trial court to the
non-U.S. interests at stake; the use of a cover letter to accompany the
class notice to provide an explanation of the significance of the class
notice in the recipient's native language; and, in class litigation
involving monetary relief, the requirement that foreign claimants
affirmatively opt into the class action.
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